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Abstract 
Due to China’s growing energy needs that stem from its unrelenting drive for economic 
development, Beijing stresses the importance of maintaining a continuous supply of energy, 
particularly oil, to maintain its impressive economic growth. However, seeing as China’s 
domestic resources are unable to satisfy its projected future oil demands, the Chinese realise 
that, barring significant domestic oil discoveries, their dependency on oil imports, particularly 
from the Middle East, will continue to increase. Since the international oil scene is dominated 
by Western energy companies, China’s fuel procurement strategy reflects a mercantilist 
approach to improving its position vis-à-vis established energy consuming nations. Beijing’s 
mercantilist stance in securing energy resources is particularly demonstrated in its oil 
diplomacy, which makes use of various political and economic incentives that can only be 
employed by the state. China’s energy-centric form of diplomacy has been inevitably 
extended to the globe’s most hydrocarbon affluent regions. Of significant importance to the 
Chinese is the Middle East, particularly the Persian Gulf as it contains a large stake of the 
world’s proven oil reserves. China has thus sought to im rove its relations with Persian Gulf 
nations such as Iran. However, Iran’s relentless pursuit to obtain nuclear capabilities has 
implicated China in Iranian-American tensions. Although China has sought to steer clear of 
becoming embroiled in the Iranian nuclear situation due to its improved standing in the Gulf, 
Beijing has unavoidably become a significant actor in the diplomatic brinkmanship over 
Iran’s nuclear situation. The scenario surrounding Iran’s nuclear ambitions essentially pits 
China’s national interests of en rgy security against its desire to maintain favourable relations 
with the United States. In light of this, the following thesis – by means of a literature survey – 
attempts to address how Beijing manages to maintain Iranian oil imports and uphold stable 
relations with Washington in the face of American-led international sanctions against Iran. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
The adoption of market reforms and an open-door policy in the 1970s under Deng Xiaoping 
propelled China to achieve astounding economic growth rates and expansive 
industrialisation. Relentless economic growth averaging at approximately ten percent per 
annum coupled with continuous development efforts led the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) to become the world’s second largest economy.1 China’s drive to become an economic 
superpower placed a huge amount of strain on domestic resources, especially oil, to advance 
its economic development. As a result, Beijing’s rapid consumption of oil in the 1990s 
outpaced the development of its domestic resources.2 In order to sustain its blistering 
economic growth rate, China was forced to become a net-oil importer in 1993. Since then, 
Chinese foreign oil purchases have vastly increased and subsequently positioned China as the 
world’s second largest oil importer behind the United States (US). However, it has been 
predicted that by 2020 China will require approximately 12 million barrels per day (b/d), 
tripling its current import levels, and consequently surpassing the US as the world’s top oil 
importer.3 Barring potentially significant domestic oil discoveries, China is unavoidably 
expected to increase its reliance on oil imports to meet its ever-growing energy demands. 
Approximately three decades of relentless fast-paced economic growth has produced an oil 
deficit that is forcing China to become increasingly dependent on oil imports. Current 
domestic consumption is estimated to be at 9.2 million barrels per day (b/d) and domestic 
production at 4.5 million b/d,4 thus, as a result of this supply and demand gap, the PRC 
imports more than half of its oil to meet the country’s energy needs. Since most of China’s oil 
fields have reached production plateaus or are in decline, its dependency on foreign oil is not 
expected to lessen. Instead, foreign oil is projected to make up 60 to 80 percent of the Asian 
                                                          
1 Christopher Howe and Tatsu Kambara, China and the Global Energy Crisis: Development and Prospects for 
China’s Oil and Natural Gas (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007), p. xi. 
2 Jim Cooney, Chinese Oil Dependence: Opportunities and Challenges, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College 
(2005): p. 1. Accessed: 08 June 2012, URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA432502 
3 Abdulaziz Sager, “GCC-China Relations: Looking Beyond Oil-Risks and Rewards,” in China’s Growing Role 
in the Middle East: Implications for the Region and Beyond (Washington: The Nixon Centre, 2010), p. 6. 
Accessed: 05 February 2013, URL: http://cftni.org/full-monograph-chinas-growing-role-in-me.pdf 
4 Amar Causevic, “A Thirsty Dragon: Rising Chinese Crude Oil Demand and Prospects for Multilateral Energy 
Security Cooperation,” Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Report No.116 (2012): pp. 2-3. Accessed: 04 July 
2012, URL: http://www.jhubc.it/ADMISSIONSBLOGDOCUMENTS/a%20thirsty%20dragon.pdf 
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Giant’s oil consumption by 2020.5 The PRC’s increasing dependence on oil imports has 
generated a strong sense of energy insecurity amongst its leadership, prompting Beijing to 
look to alternate fuel options and promote energy reducing initiatives to decrease 
consumption. However, Daojing asserts that, “no matter how China carries out its energy 
policies, dependence on imported oil will have to continue.”6 Beijing’s heavy reliance on oil 
imports has generated insecurity and concerns that an interruption in oil supply or 
unforeseeable price hikes could hinder the country’s growth and, in turn, spawn social unrest 
that will have the potential to undermine the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) hold over the 
country.7 Since energy security is closely linked to political and economic stability, Beijing 
places access to reliable and adequate energy supplies at the top of its national security 
agenda.8 
In an effort to improve energy security, the PRC has encouraged its national oil companies 
(NOCs) to set their sights beyond China and acquire foreign energy assets in the form of 
equity agreements that, unlike the global market, can provide consumers with a greater 
supply of oil at cheaper prices.9 In 2008, the total oil production of China’s top three NOCs 
(CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC) amounted to 45 million tonnes.10 The notion that equity oil is 
a better option than total reliance on the market stems from Chinese concerns that supply 
bottlenecks in parts of the world, and the unpredictable nature of the international market, 
may jeopardise China’s access to oil supplies which are vital for sustaining its economic 
growth.11 As such, China prefers equity agreements as they somewhat insulate the Chinese 
economy from oil price hikes and garner Beijing greater control over its foreign oil 
supplies.12 In line with this view, the Chinese leadership has assisted and continues to aid 
Chinese NOCs in their foreign investment endeavours. By employing diplomatic efforts as 
well as the use of political and economic incentives, China has lured numerous energy rich 
                                                          
5 Erica Downs, “China,” The Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Energy Security Series (2006), p. 10. Accessed: 
16 July 2012, URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2006/12/china/12china.pdf 
6 Zha Daojiong, “China’s Energy Security and its International Relations,” The China and Eurasia Forum 
Quarterly, vol.3, no.3 (2005): p. 42. 
7 Heinrich Kreft, “China’s Quest for Energy,” Policy Review, Issue 139 (2006): p. 65. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Downs, “China,” p. 37. 
10 Philip Andrews-Speed and Roland Dannreuther, China Oil and Global Politics (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 
76. 
11Kreft, “China’s Quest for Energy,” p. 65. 
12 Erica Downs, China’s Quest for Energy Security (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2000), p. 18. Accessed: 
16 July 2012, URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA384039 
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countries from across the globe into permitting Chinese NOCs to enter into their energy 
sectors. Although Western nations frown upon the state assistance that China’s NOCs 
receive, the PRC reasons that, since the international oil market is dominated by Western 
companies, Chinese oil firms cannot gain a competitive standing without Beijing’s assistance 
in their foreign ventures.13 As a result of China’s influence over its NOC’s overseas energy 
activities, the PRC’s oil companies are considered to be proxies for advancing Beijing’s 
international interests; hence the reason why China’s NOCs are characterised as arms of the 
Chinese government and perceived as a threat by the West who consider them to be a 
destabilising force in global energy markets.14 Nevertheless, in spite of the West’s outcry 
against China’s unwillingness to distance itself from its NOCs, Chinese oil corporations, 
together with Beijing’s aid, continue to press forward in their relentless mission to ‘lock up’ 
international energy supplies. It has been outlined that, unlike Beijing’s Western counterparts 
who undertake a liberal market-oriented approach towards securing energy supplies, China, 
in perceiving the accumulation of oil as a zero-sum game, has opted for a mercantilist stance 
to characterise its energy strategy. Due to the heavy influence of the state in China’s NOC’s 
business dealings and Beijing’s unilateral stance towards fuel resource procurement, 
mercantilism is a term that has become synonymous with China’s energy drive. 
In its oil diversification efforts, China has spread its economic and diplomatic interests to 
wherever there are excess hydrocarbon resources.15 Beijing has inevitably sought to secure 
oil imports from the world’s richest oil regions, most notably the Persian Gulf.16 Noting the 
Persian Gulf’s rich endowment in ‘black gold’, Chinese foreign policy has prioritised 
improving relations with Gulf States as, “officials regard the region to be of long-lasting geo-
economic and geopolitical significance.”17 Moreover, in the interest of ensuring energy 
security, Beijing is especially attracted to Gulf producers because of their, “large proven oil 
reserves, idle surplus capacity and relatively low development and production costs.”18 As a 
result, China’s NOCs, with assistance from government, have endeavoured to gain a stronger 
                                                          
13 Downs, “China,” p. 41. 
14 Chen Shaofeng, “Assessing the Impact of China’s Foreign Energy Quest on its Energy Security,” East Asian 
Institute (EAI), Working Paper No.145 (2009): p. 1. Accessed: 23 June 2012, URL: 
http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/EWP145.pdf 
15 Zha Daojiong, “China’s Energy Security and its International Relations,” p. 53. 
16 Hongyi H. Lai, “China’s Oil Diplomacy: is it a global security threat?” Third World Quarterly, vol.28, no.3 
(2007): p. 522. 
17 John Calabrese, “China and the Persian Gulf: Energy and Security,” Middle East Journal, vol.52, no.3 (1998): 
p. 353. 
18 Ibid., p. 356. 
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foothold in this region’s energy sector by acquiring long-term supply contracts as well as oil 
exploration and development projects.19 By fostering closer economic relations with oil-
producing Gulf States, China hopes to gain its fair share of oil from a region that is 
dominated by the US. Via the establishment of economic interdependence, Beijing aims to 
lock into the Gulf’s fuel reserves as energy experts predict that the Persian Gulf will remain 
an important source of crude oil for China over the next 25 years.20  
Although the marked expansion of Chinese diplomatic, energy and economic interests in the 
Gulf represents one of the most important geopolitical trends of the 21st century, China, 
aware of the United States’ dominant role in the Middle East,21 has treaded carefully in the 
region in order to avoid being perceived by Washington as a threat to its hegemonic position 
in the area. Yet, as a result of its markedly improved presence in the Persian Gulf, Beijing has 
been thrust into the mix of diplomacy and tensions surrounding the dispute over Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions. As a result, the Sino-Iranian relationship has been placed under intense 
scrutiny as a US-led international coalition calls upon China to support efforts to dismantle 
Iran’s nuclear programme. Sino-Iranian economic ties have evolved to become highly robust 
despite the international community’s attempts to increase the diplomatic and economic 
isolation of Iran vis-à-vis intensified sanctions.22 Moreover, since China’s relations with Iran 
are primarily shaped by its growing energy needs, Beijing has been reluctant to throw its 
weight behind international efforts to isolate Tehran. Given that Beijing’s growth is largely 
driven by its strong relationship with the West, particularly the US, China’s association with 
Iran has the, “potential to become too great a liability to maintain.”23 However, unlike other 
nations which have minimised their interactions with the Islamic Republic, Beijing has 
intensified its economic investments in the country despite international sanctions. Due to the 
pull out of Western energy companies from Iran, China is presented with increased access to 
Iran’s oil and gas reserves.24 Caught between maintaining comity with the US and its energy 
interests in Iran, China has chosen a balanced and pragmatic response to its ‘Persian Gulf 
                                                          
19 Calabrese, “China and the Persian Gulf: Energy and Security,” p. 356. 
20 Downs, “China,” p. 2. 
21 The Middle East is traditionally comprised of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Gaza Strip, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, 
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, UAE, West Bank and Yemen. 
22 Aaron Morris, “From Silk to Sanctions and Back Again: Contemporary Sino-Iranian Economic Relations,” Al 
Nakhlah: Online Journal on Southwest Asian and Islamic Civilization, (2012):p. 1. Accessed: 26 February 2013, 
URL: 
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/al%20Nakhlah/archives/Winter2012/Morris_Final.pdf 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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Dilemma’. Beijing has sought to appease both sides by condemning Iran’s nuclear 
proliferation ambitions whilst simultaneously voicing that Tehran has a right to utilise nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes.  
Based on various assessments of China’s stance on sanctions against Iran it has been noted 
that, although Beijing condemns the use of sanctions to coerce Iran into giving up its nuclear 
aspirations, China has nonetheless played a role in the issuing of United Nations (UN) 
sanctions against the Islamic Republic. Despite this, the PRC has shielded Iran from the 
imposition of aggressive UN sanctions as Beijing has delayed the passage of, and diluted 
each, Security Council Resolution aimed at Iran, thus providing Tehran with diplomatic cover 
and extended time to advance its nuclear plans.25 Furthermore, by ‘softening’ UN sanctions 
against Tehran, China has ensured the protection of Chinese investments in Iran and the 
production and export of Iranian fuel to its shores.26 In light of China’s soft handling of the 
Iranian nuclear issue, the PRC’s determination towards preventing the possibility of a nuclear 
Iran is being questioned. Although Chinese officials have on numerous occasions reassured 
the West that they condemn Tehran’s nuclear proliferation aspirations,27 numerous analysts 
such as Berman highlight that China’s energy interests are preventing Beijing from assuming 
a more aggressive stance against the Islamic Republic. 
1.1. Research Question 
How does Beijing maintain Iranian oil imports and at the same time uphold stable relations 
with Washington in the face of an American-led international campaign for sanctions against 
Tehran? 
1.2. Main Argument 
In light of recent sanctions against Iran, China’s continued economic engagement with the 
Islamic Republic is motivated by its energy interests. 
1.3. Objectives 
 The first research objective is to prove that China’s improved position and keen 
interest in the Persian Gulf is motivated by its energy interests. 
                                                          
25 John W. Garver, “Is China Playing a Dual Game in Iran?” The Washington Quarterly, vol.34, no.1 (2011): p. 
76. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ilan Berman, “Beijing’s Iranian Gamble,” Far Eastern Economic Review, vol.172, no.3 (2009): p. 55. 
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 The second aim of this thesis is to outline that energy mercantilism underpins China’s 
accumulation of hydrocarbon resources, especially oil. 
 Thirdly, this thesis demonstrates that, stemming from China’s energy security 
concerns, Beijing will continue to import Iranian oil whilst simultaneously attempting 
to maintain stable relations with the US. 
1.4. Methodology 
The methodology adopted for this thesis is that of a literature survey. The consulted literature, 
as reflected in this thesis, can be separated into three categories, namely China’s energy 
security/strategy, China’s Gulf strategy and Sino-Iranian Relations. When collectively 
viewed, these three categories provide a holistic view from which one can assess China’s 
capacity to maintain its energy interests in Iran in the face of sanctions against the Islamic 
Republic. The expanding literature on China’s oil diplomacy and energy security covers an 
array of issues yet, although the collection of articles reviewed has been informative, they 
also have their limitations. Firstly, in some cases the data relaying China’s oil consumption 
and imports is outdated, only accounting for the 1990s to early 2000s. Secondly, the varying 
estimates of the PRC’s future oil consumption and production make it difficult to 
substantially grasp the magnitude of China’s projected oil deficit and subsequent energy 
demands. Moreover, most of the literature pertaining to Sino-Iranian relations predominantly 
situates Iran-China ties within the PRC’s foreign policy. There are a very few articles and 
studies that have taken into consideration factors (aside from alleviating the effects of 
sanctions) that influence Iran’s approach towards Beijing. In addition, Sino-Iranian relations 
and China’s expanding influence in the Gulf are mainly analysed from a Western perspective. 
As a result, Beijing-Tehran ties have been generally assessed to determine the potential 
effects that this relationship will have on the West, especially the US – a nation that has a 
long record of being at odds with Iran. 
1.5. Theoretical Background 
This thesis is informed by mercantilism, particularly energy mercantilism. However, it is not 
concerned with the economic intricacies of mercantilism but rather with its appeal for the 
dominance of the state in economic co-ordination and how this is reflected in China’s pursuit 
of fuel resources. Mercantilism is one of the oldest approaches, and arguably the most 
important one, to the study of the international political economy (IPE). Although 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
7 
 
mercantilism dates back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, its tenets are still 
influencing economic practises and policies around the globe. Mercantilism is not a 
systematic theory but a coupling of policy prescriptions and ideas that were often noted on 
pamphlets. This school of thought aligns closely with realism as mercantilists assert that the, 
“nation state and the interplay of national interests (as opposed to corporate interests),” are 
the main determinants of the world economy.28 Mercantilism is essentially typified by 
government’s attempts to manipulate the market in order to maximise their own interests, 
irrespective of whether this is at the expense of others. In short, Gilpin argues that, “each 
nation will pursue economic policies that reflect domestic needs and external political 
ambition without much concern for the effects of these policies on other countries or on the 
international economic system as a whole.”29  
Although mercantilism contains various ideas and doctrines there are three core tenets that 
typify this school of thought. Firstly, mercantilists are concerned with the dominance of 
national interest in economic policy. Secondly, they stress the role of the state in dictating 
economic activity; and lastly, mercantilism emphasises the importance of creating a 
favourable trade balance to establish a wealthy nation. Although the classical mercantilist 
thinkers stressed different elements of mercantilist thought, there was a general recognition 
that national security, state building and the creation of economic wealth were 
interconnected. Thus, mercantilists advocated that economics and politics were inseparable, 
with the state assuming the oversight of political-economic dealings.30 This position is 
strongly opposed by liberal economic theory (as in those theories proposed by Smith, Ricardo 
and Hayek) which stresses that individual enterprise devoid of state interference is the most 
rational plan for advanci g a nation’s economy. 
Early mercantilists’ contribution to the study of IPE lies in their acknowledgement and 
rationalisation of the state’s role in regulating the domestic economy to obtain wealth, 
security and the fulfilment of national interests. Mercantilism’s emphasis on state 
                                                          
28 Harry Stephan and Michael Power, The Scramble for Africa in the 21st Century: From the Old World to the 
New (Cape Town: Renaissance Press, 2012), p. 16. 
29 Ibid., p. 17. 
30 Using the example of England’s Corn Laws, the establishment of the iron industry, and navigation acts, 
Lipson depicts the interaction between economic and political spheres and highlights that economic issues must 
be subordinate to national interest. – Ephraim Lipson, Planned Economy or Free Enterprise (London: Adam 
and Charles Black, 1946), pp. 62-63. 
For background on the conception of political economy see: Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of 
International Relations (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 10-11. 
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intervention was particularly prevalent in the 18th and early 19th centuries. Whereas classical 
mercantilism was primarily concerned with gaining wealth and power, economic nationalism 
(a form of mercantilism in the late 18th and 19th centuries) focused on the internal 
development of the national economy effectively arguing for a planned economy. During this 
era, mercantilist thinkers, particularly the German historical economists (who proposed 
inherently mercantilist measures to develop their country into a major power) deemed state 
intervention necessary for promoting the economic growth of developing nations, essentially 
advocating that the, “state should be the main determinant of organised political, economic, 
and social activity.”31 This contradicted Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, which argued that 
competitive markets and rational human nature should be relied on to generate economic 
prosperity.  
In retaliation against liberal prescriptions of laissez-faire economic progress, mercantilists 
advocated that mercantilism should underpin the development of nations. In line with its 
concerns regarding accumulation and protectionism, the mercantile system focused on 
establishing, “the best policies for promoting the wealth and power of the nation.”32 In 
opposing the prescriptions of liberal economic development, mercantilists argued that instead 
of the state distancing itself from the economy it should assume a central position in guiding 
economic activity.33 Ultimately, almost every branch of industry was (to some extent) 
brought under the control of the state. It must, however, be noted that mercantilists did not 
argue for a totalitarian state, rather they emphasised that the state should serve as a guide and 
not a dictator of economic activity.34 Fundamentally, mercantilists purported that 
government’s effective and efficient organisation of private capital and handling of market 
forces would ensure the development of the national economy. Based on the evolution of 
mercantilist thought over the centuries, Moffat suggests that mercantilism can be categorised 
into two prescriptions. Firstly, it may be described as a system that strives for the protection 
and direction of industry by the state, or secondly, mercantilism can be considered as the 
state’s control and exploitation of economic opportunities for solely national ends.35 
According to Moffat, the second outlook is a better interpretation as he deems that, 
                                                          
31 W. Raymond Duncan, Barbra Jancar-Webster and Bob Switky, World Politics In The 21st Century: Student 
Choice Edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2009), p. 414. 
32 David Colander and Harry Landreth, History of Economic Thought (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002), p. 44. 
33 Duncan, Jancar-Webster and Switky, World Politics In The 21st Century: Student Choice Edition, p. 414. 
34 Ibid. 
35 James E. Moffat, “Nationalism and Economic Theory,” Journal of Political Economy, vol.36, no.4 (1928): p. 
423. 
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“mercantilism means not so much the protection of industry as the control and direction of 
industry in the interests of achieving national strength.”36 
Although liberal economic practises have been adopted as the global norm, mercantilist 
influences are nevertheless still prevalent. This is especially reflected in China’s energy 
strategy. Beijing’s pursuit of energy supplies displays an adherence to mercantilist 
prescriptions of governmental interference in the market to realise its strategy of obtaining 
secure and reliable fuel supplies and additionally underlines the notion that the state should 
maintain a central role in the development of a strong economy. The postulations that Beijing 
has chosen a politically motivated and state-oriented approach to energy security lies in the 
government’s entrenched influence in China’s energy sector and Beijing’s hand in its NOCs 
international procurement of fuel resources. The state-centred structure of China’s economy 
(particularly its energy sector) means that the PRC depends greatly on state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to fulfil its fuel needs.37 Due to this state-centric approach, business 
decisions take place within a structure that entrenches the dominance of China’s NOCs and 
the CCP’s influence within these companies. An advantage of this mercantilist approach to 
energy policy is that the role of the market in determining supply, pricing and distribution of 
energy resources is limited.38  
On the international front, Beijing is pursuing an energy mercantilist strategy. Although 
China pragmatically participates in global energy markets, it has simultaneously taken 
precautions to guard against supply and price disruptions. Since China distrusts the markets 
to fulfil present and projected energy needs, Beijing, via its NOCs, has taken subsequent 
measures in the form of equity agreements to hedge against sub-optimal occurrences in the 
global oil market.39 Due to this mercantilist approach to energy security, China, in search of 
securing offshore oil assets, has extended extensive diplomatic, political and economic 
assistance to those NOCs who aim to procure favourable overseas energy deals. This 
approach to securing energy supplies has come to be known as energy mercantilism, an 
emerging resource accumulation strategy that basically circumvents the market in favour of 
inter-governmental dealings to secure fuel resources. This strategy, as will be highlighted in 
chapter two, is particularly evident in China’s oil diplomacy. Even though the Chinese deny 
                                                          
36 Moffat, “Nationalism and Economic Theory,” p. 423. 
37 John Lee, “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil,” The Washington Quarterly, vol.35, no.3 (2012): p. 75. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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subscribing to mercantilist influences because of the international opprobrium that would 
stem from such claims, it is nevertheless undeniably evident that Beijing’s energy strategy is 
influenced by the mercantilist argument for state intervention. 
1.6. Chapter Outline 
Chapter two highlights that Beijing’s oil accumulation strategy displays mercantilist 
undertones. By shedding light on mercantilism’s advocacy for state intervention and outlining 
energy mercantilism (a resource accumulation strategy that mainly bypasses international 
commodity markets in favour of inter-governmental dealings), this chapter conveys that, due 
to the state-centred structure of China’s energy sector and the heavy involvement of the 
Chinese government in their national energy companies’ (NECs) foreign ventures, Beijing’s 
oil strategy does indeed have mercantilist characteristics. Secondly, by touching on China’s 
belief that international markets favour Western nations, this chapter outlines that in seeking 
an advantage in the global oil accumulation game, Beijing’s mercantilist oil diplomacy has 
also been extended to pariah states. 
Chapter three demonstrates that, in light of calls from the West for the PRC to distance itself 
from Iran, China, due to Beijing’s longstanding relations with Tehran and the geo-economic 
and strategic factors that rationalise relations with the Islamic Republic, has thus far been 
unwilling to sacrifice its ties with Tehran for international collective security interests. 
However, since the PRC is not heavily dependent on the Islamic Republic for its economic 
development and national security, this chapter hints at the possibility that, if Washington-
Tehran tension were to heighten, there is a high chance that China would forsake its relations 
with Iran to remain in favour with the West, especially the US. 
Chapter four emphasises the importance of the Persian Gulf for China’s energy security and 
aims to demonstrate that Beijing has sought to improve relations with Gulf countries in an 
attempt to secure and guarantee energy supplies for China. However, aware of America’s 
possessiveness over this region, this chapter stresses that Chinese foreign policy also attempts 
to delicately balance the maintenance of stable relations with Washington against China’s 
interests in developing multi-dimensional relations with energy rich Gulf nations. This is 
most aptly depicted by China’s handling of its ‘Persian Gulf Dilemma’ – a dilemma 
characterised by Beijing’s reluctance to side with either the West (particularly the US) or Iran 
over the latter’s nuclear issue as the costs of siding with either party are too great for any 
nation, let alone a rising ‘superpower’. Instead, in an effort to protect its interests with both 
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parties, Beijing has chosen a balanced, middle-of-the-road approach which essentially colours 
China’s response to sanctions against Iran. 
Lastly, chapter five provides a summary of the thesis and discusses the possibility of Beijing 
scaling down its energy commitments in Iran in order to uphold Sino-American relations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
China’s Mercantilist Oil Strategy 
Since Beijing joined the oil-importing club in 1993, the question of how China fuels itself has 
generated a substantial amount of literature. Throughout this body of literature there seems to 
be one shared view in particular that, unlike industrialised Western nations that opt for a 
liberal-democratic approach towards global energy markets, China has adopted a zero-sum 
mercantilist outlook. In line with this view, this chapter aims to demonstrate that Beijing 
pursues energy resources in a mercantilist fashion. However, it must be noted that this 
chapter does not intend to delve into the intricacies of mercantilism, instead by emphasising 
this theory’s advocacy of state intervention which is particularly evident in energy 
mercantilism; this chapter demonstrates that, through the state-dominated structure of its 
energy sector, China takes a state-centric approach towards securing energy supplies.  
Due to China’s demand-induced energy scarcity situation,40 the Chinese have acknowledged 
that a majority of their energy needs, especially their oil r quirements, will have to be met 
with imports. This becomes starkly evident when analysing the PRC’s flat oil production and 
projected output decline. The annual deficit in China’s oil supplies is expected to rise to 197 
million tonnes in 2015 and leap to 250 million tonnes in 2020.41 In the face of rising energy 
demands, the CCP realises that oil is the only energy fuel that could pose a threat to its 
survival, as it needs to be imported in large quantities to satisfy societal and economic 
dependency. This places immense pressure on China to engage actively in the international 
energy market and vigorously pursue overseas oil supplies to ensure its energy security. 
Thus, Chinese NOCs, with the support of their government, have stepped into the 
international oil scene with the aim of internationalising China’s oil industry. Although 
Chinese government officials have never clearly outlined their objectives for substantially 
influencing their NOCs, China’s intentions of considerably increasing the number of 
countries that supply oil to the PRC and gaining direct ownership over vital foreign reserves 
became particularly transparent when its energy companies went on a global shopping spree 
in the aftermath of the global financial meltdown. In 2009 China spent an estimated US$ 18 
                                                          
40 Demand induced scarcity, “results from population growth within a region or increased per capita 
consumption of a resource, either of which heightens the demand for the resource.” – Val Percival and Thomas 
Homer Dixon, “Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of South Africa,” Journal of Peace 
Research, vol.35, no.3 (1998): p. 280. 
41 Pak Lee, “China’s Quest for Oil Security: Oil (Wars) in the Pipeline?” The Pacific Review, vol.18, no.2 
(2005): p. 267. 
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billion on merger and acquisition deals in upstream oil and gas and, in 2010, this figure 
increased to US$ 29.39 billion.42 China’s aggressive pursuit of ‘locking up’ oil supplies has 
raised anxiety levels, particularly those of Washington. According to former US Deputy 
Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick, China’s ‘locking up’ of fuel supplies in the form of 
equity agreements has raised Washington’s anxiety over its energy security.43 Furthermore, 
aside from the PRC’s equity agreements which “remove millions of barrels of oil from the 
supply pool,”44 the international community is also concerned with Beijing’s willingness to 
engage with pariah states to secure energy resources.45  
2.1. Energy Mercantilism: Bypassing the Market through State Intervention 
2.1.1. The Mercantilist Advocacy for State Intervention 
Before broaching energy mercantilism, a brief overview of mercantilism’s advocacy for state 
intervention is required, since government involvement underpins this energy strategy. It is 
essential to keep in mind when attempting to interpret mercantilist thought that, despite its 
primacy in IPE, it does not have a universal definition. This is due to the various 
interpretations of mercantilism and the consequent varieties of mercantilist thought that 
prevailed in Britain, France and Germany from the 16th to the 18th century.46 Despite the 
numerous variations of mercantilism that were produced with the progress of history, the 
emphasis placed on the state to assume control of the nation’s economic life has remained the 
core thesis of this school of thought.47 By emphasising the necessity of governmental 
interference in market principles or the economic order, mercantilism advises that 
governments should maintain a central role in the development of a strong national economy 
in order to ensure the security of the state. Thus, in taking this political-economy approach, 
Gilpin defines mercantilism as the, “attempts of governments to manipulate economic 
arrangements in order to maximise their own interests, whether or not this is at the expense of 
                                                          
42 Roland Dannreuther, “China and Global Oil: Vulnerability and Opportunity,” International Affairs, vol.87, 
no.6 (2011): p. 1346. 
43 Ibid., p. 1349. 
Michael T. Klare, “Fuelling the Dragon: China’s Strategic Energy Dilemma,” Current History, vol.105, no.690 
(2006): p. 182. 
44 Cherie Canning, “Pursuit of the Pariah: Iran, Sudan and Myanmar in China’s Energy Security Strategy,” 
Security Challenges, vol.3, no.1 (2007): p. 51. 
45 Linda Jackobson and Zha Daojiong, “China and the Worldwide Search for Oil Security,” Asia-Pacific 
Review, vol.13, no.2 (2006): p. 65. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Philip W. Buck, The Politics of Mercantilism (New York: Octagon Books, 1974), p. 21. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
14 
 
others. These interests may be related to domestic concerns (such as full employment and 
price stability) or to foreign policy (such as security and independence).”48 
This notion of the state’s primacy in a nation’s economic endeavours is clearly demonstrated 
by the classical mercantilist period (1500-1800). By emphasising domestic production and 
the control of export markets, classical mercantilism was essentially an economic policy that 
shaped the relationship between Western European powers and their overseas territories.49 
Fundamentally, mercantilism promoted policies of political and economic self-reliance and 
the creation of wealth through the means of a favourable balance of trade (exporting more 
and importing less).50 Since gold and silver were the currency of trade at the time, bullionism 
(which proposes that the state and national economy can be measured by the amount of gold 
and silver it possesses) was used to measure a state’s national economy.51 Thus, mercantilists 
advocated that the strength of a country could be determined or measured by its accumulation 
of gold.52 Mercantilists reasoned that, in an effort to strengthen the nation, a successful trade 
policy would ‘swell government coffers’ and thus lead to the development of a strong 
nation.53 Bullionism required that a nation always maintained a favourable balance of trade. 
This essentially meant that, in order to increase the amount of gold in the national treasury, 
the value of the state’s exports would have to be greater than its imports.54 Mercantilists 
argued that this could only be achieved by government intervention in the form of state 
subsidies for exporting industries and the discouragement of imported manufactured goods 
through the imposition of high tariffs, duties or quotas. Thus, in an attempt to secure power 
and the nation’s welfare, “the state was always entitled, frequently obligated and generally 
invited to exercise control over most of the economic activities of the nation.”55 In this 
context, mercantilists were essentially lobbying for an economic system that was in the, 
“strictest sense of the words, a political economy.”56 This prescription of extensive state 
regulation in a nation’s economy is what chiefly divides the mercantilists from their laissez-
                                                          
48 Robert Gilpin, “Three Models of the Future,” International Organisation, vol.29, no.1 (1975): p. 45. 
49 Audra Diptee, “Mercantilism,” in Colonialism: An International, Social, Cultural and Political 
Encyclopaedia, ed. Melvin E. (California: ABC-CLIO, 2003). p. 384. 
50 Alexander Hamilton, “Excerpts From Report on Manufactures,” in International Political Economy: State 
Market Relations in the Changing Global Order, eds. C. Roe Goddard, John T. Passé-Smith and John G. 
Conklin (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p. 75. 
51 Diptee, “Mercantilism,” p. 384. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Buck, The Politics of Mercantilism, p. 72. 
56 Ibid., p. 74. 
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faire counterparts.57 Mercantilists did, however, differ on the extent of state involvement in 
the economy. This is particularly demonstrated by Germany’s historical school’s theorists 
Friedrich List (1789-1846) and Gustav von Schmoller (1838-1917). 
In the early stages of development, List argued that the state should (via protectionist 
policies) be heavily involved in developing national industry. However, once mercantilist 
economic policies had assisted the nation in achieving a thriving national industry, List 
advocated that the state needed to adopt laissez-faire means to maintain economic 
development. List reasoned that, once a state achieved manufacturing supremacy, it needed to 
orientate itself towards the competition spawned from free trade to, “protect its own 
manufacturers and merchants against retrogression and indolence.”58 Thus, in this context 
List sided with some liberal economic conclusions and rejected a few mercantilist ideas.  
Unlike List’s developmental model, which is a progression from protectionism to free trade, 
Schmoller emphasised that even if a state achieved industrial supremacy, it should not 
prescribe to laissez-faire means to maintain economic development. Instead, Schmoller 
stressed that the state and national economy should remain intertwined as, “economic forces, 
while living for themselves, should yet entirely serve the state, and that the state, pursuing its 
own ends, should at the same time place all its might and all its members in the true service 
of the national economy.”59 The core of mercantilism for Schmoller was not just simply 
modern state making, but, “state making and national economy making at the same time.”60 
This insistence on the dual makeup of mercantilism is strongly juxtaposed against List’s 
eventual separation of the state and economy. Although List and Schmoller differ on the 
extent of state interference in national economic advances, both scholars convey a 
nationalistic sense of development. List advocated that a national economy’s development 
would be hindered if it did not, “constitute factors of national scale and national policy.”61 
Meanwhile, Schmoller suggested that the essence of mercantilism lay, “in the total 
transformation of society and its organisation, as well as of the state and its institutions, in the 
replacing of a local and territorial economic policy by that of the national state.”62 
                                                          
57 Buck, The Politics of Mercantilism, p. 78. 
58 Friedrich List, National System of Political Economy Volume 2: The Theory (New York: Cosmo, Inc., 2006), 
p. 87. 
59 Gustav von Schmoller, The Mercantile System and its Historical Significance (New York: The McMillan 
Company, 1897), pp. 90-91. 
60 Ibid., p. 50. 
61 Ibid., p. 12. 
62 Ibid., p. 51. 
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Essentially, mercantilism was seen not so much in terms of the protection of national 
industry, but as a representation of the state’s control and manipulation of economic activities 
for purely national interests.63 
2.1.2. State Intervention in the Contemporary World 
In light of the contemporary world largely adhering to liberal economic prescriptions, 
mercantilism is considered to be an archaic description of economic functioning. However, 
mercantilism is still prevalent, albeit under various modi operandi.64 By providing 
mercantilism with the alias of state-capitalism, Schneider outlines that, aside from traditional 
mercantilist undertakings such as protectionist policies, subsidies, national industries and 
state-backed national champions, mercantilist entities have also emerged in the form of state-
owned enterprises, public-private partnerships, and the state as a minority shareholder.65 
Thus, state intervention in economic life is still prevalent as contemporary mercantilism 
draws on the classic mercantilist strategy of state intervention for promoting and protecting 
domestic industry and ensuring SOE’s competitiveness. State intervention, in the form of 
financial incentives (protectionist measures, trade remedies or state subsidies) are therefore 
still utilised in order to achieve a semi-free market.66 By primarily adhering to its classical 
roots, contemporary mercantilism (or state-capitalism), “is favoured not because it is the most 
efficient way of producing and distributing goods, but because it serves political aims.”67 
Instead of relying on markets, which by operating in the moment are unable to foresee the 
results of market engagement, mercantilism opts for, “foreseeable, clear-cut outcomes that 
can be planned or influenced by the state.”68 Hence, mercantilism prioritises, “economic and 
political objectives over considerations of global efficiency.”69 This is particularly evident in 
energy mercantilism. 
  
                                                          
63 Moffat, “Nationalism and Economic Theory,” p. 422. 
64 Gilpin, “Three Models of the Future,” pp. 45-46. 
65 Henrique Schneider, “State-capitalism and Globalisation – a Challenge to Whom?” Iliria International 
Review, Issue 2 (2012): p. 122. 
66 Ibid., p. 126. 
67 Ibid., p. 123. 
68 Ibid., pp. 123-124. 
69 Gilpin, “Three Models of the Future,” p. 45. 
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2.1.3. Energy Mercantilism: Bypassing the Market 
Although the world relies mainly on the open marketplace to determine the distribution and 
price of fuel resources, the emergence of energy mercantilism (an energy security strategy) 
has led to the questioning of the market’s credibility as an effective mechanism for ensuring 
energy supply security. As a result, numerous nations (especially Asian states) are bypassing 
the global energy market with equity agreements to secure fuel resources – particularly oil. 
Energy mercantilism has gained significance in the international hydrocarbon scene due to a 
renewed focus on energy security, especially amongst countries that are highly dependent on 
energy supplies to drive their economic development. Heightened energy insecurity fears 
stem from several factors, namely, an increasingly tight oil market and rising oil prices, 
unstable energy exporting countries, the threat of terrorism, nationalist fervour over 
indigenous resources, suspicions of a scramble for resources, geopolitical tensions and a 
country’s inherent need to feed its economic growth.70 In addition to these factors, there is a 
worldwide anxiety over whether there will be a sufficient amount of resources to meet the 
world’s future energy demands. Stemming from these concerns, energy is now placed at the 
top of many national agendas.71 Numerous countries (particularly industrialising Asian 
nations) are responding to their energy insecurity fears with an array of strategies that 
endeavour to guarantee supply and price stability. Efforts directed towards improving energy 
security range from traditional dependence on cooperative market approaches to a more hard-
line competitive, mercantilist stance.72 The latter approach has drastically changed the way 
that oil is bought as markets are undermined by countries such as China and India who 
circumvent the market by ‘locking up’ fuel supplies directly with energy producing nations.73 
Since energy mercantilism is typified by governments’ use of NECs to advance strategic 
national interests, Leverett aptly defines resource or energy mercantilism as:  
The use of economic and foreign policy instruments by national governments to help 
their state-owned national energy companies (NECs) secure access to overseas 
                                                          
70 Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs, vol.85, no. 2 (2006): p. 69. 
71 Ibid., p. 70. 
72 Mikkal E. Herberg, Asia’s Energy Insecurity: Cooperation or Conflict, p. 340. Accessed: 18 April 2013, 
URL: http://www.scribd.com/doc/131589490/ASIA%E2%80%99S-ENERGY-INSECURITY-
COOPERATION-OR-CONFLICT 
73 Donald Miller, Energy Mercantilism: Is Private Oil Threatening the NYMEX? Accessed: 15 March 2013, 
URL: http://www.investmentu.com/2007/%E2%80%A6/20070125.html 
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hydrocarbon resources on a more privileged basis than simple supply contracts based 
on market prices.74 
Energy mercantilism seems to be a popular strategy amongst industrialising countries for 
securing hydrocarbon resources, as the purchase of equity barrels eliminates market price risk 
and it is comparatively low-priced when compared to oil sold on the international markets.75 
However, the equity route directly counters the market in terms of pricing and distribution. 
When oil is traded globally on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and other 
bourses, customers pay approximately the same price for their oil. However, long-term 
bilateral supply contracts avoid market dictations, as energy producers, when dealing directly 
with a potential customer, can pursue various pricing strategies that entail political 
agreements and thereby utilising alternative methods of payment (such as development of 
infrastructure, aid and trade agreements) to secure oil supplies.76  
Pursuing hydrocarbon resources in this manner essentially undermines and distorts the 
functioning of the market as the energy mercantilist approach sets oil prices at a fixed price, 
irrespective of future market fluctuations. Thus, all states will not pay the same price for their 
oil. As a result, energy mercantilism ultimately counters market pricing and destabilises the 
supply and distribution networks that determine oil prices.77 This is a concern for Western 
countries that mainly rely on the market for their oil supplies. From the West’s perspective, 
“bilateral deals lock up too much of the world’s oil supplies and harm the liquidity of the 
open market.”78 Moreover, off-market supply contracts make Western nations susceptible to 
price shocks and volatility as off-the-market deals result in global markets struggling to 
“manage tight markets, shortages, and disruptions to supply.”79 However, despite the 
aforementioned concerns over energy mercantilism, countries such as China remain bent on 
pursuing oil assets in an energy mercantilist manner. 
 
                                                          
74 Flynt Leverett, “Resource Mercantilism and the Militarization of Resource Management,” in Energy Security 
and Global Politics: The Militarisation of Resource Management, eds. Daniel Moran and James A Russell 
(New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 211. 
75 Erica Downs, “The Chinese Energy Security Debate,” The China Quarterly, vol.177 (2004): p. 35. 
76 Simon Wilson, “Russia, Iran and a dangerous Axis of Oil.” Accessed: 15 March 2013, URL: 
http://www.moneyweek.com/investments/commodities/russia-iran-and-a-dangerous-axis-of-oil 
77 Miller, Energy Mercantilism: Is Private Oil Threatening the NYMEX? 
78 Wilson, “Russia, Iran and a dangerous Axis of Oil”. 
79 Ibid. 
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2.1.4. The Mercantilist Structure of China’s Energy Sector 
Beijing’s fast-paced economic development is inevitably accompanied by a demand for 
natural resources, especially oil. Since energy resources are the main ingredient for any 
economy to function optimally, nations around the globe view, “energy security as an 
inherent component of their national interests.”80 Aside from a reliable and uninterrupted 
energy supply, Beijing also considers a cheap supply of energy to be essential to its national 
and domestic interests.81 Although the pursuit of a relatively cheap and secure access to 
overseas oil is vital for decreasing economic risk in all oil-importing nations, in China’s case 
securing favourable access to energy resources is deemed necessary for mitigating threats to 
the survival of the CCP.82  
Since China is not a democratic country, the CCP stakes its legitimacy on bettering the lives 
of the country’s citizens by delivering continuous economic growth. In order to achieve this, 
large amounts of energy supplies are considered to be a prerequisite for maintaining 
relentless development.83 Thus, a potential disruption to oil supply and unforeseeable price 
increases may lead to a stagnating Chinese economy. This could fuel mass discontent which 
may destabilise the CCP’s hold over the country.84 In an effort to avoid such a scenario, 
Chinese leaders consider an annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth of eight percent 
with minimum inflation as the key to maintaining social stability and regime security.85 
Given that industrial development requires large amounts of oil imports, the CCP has, in 
order to mitigate risks to its regime survival, avoided solely relying on international markets 
to meet its energy needs. Instead, since the Chinese economy evolved from being 
predominantly private-sector orientated (prior to 1989) to state-sector run (since the mid-
1990s), the accumulation of energy supplies has fallen mostly under state oversight.86 
Essentially, China’s state-centred political economy considers energy policy, regime security 
                                                          
80 Lee, “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil,” p. 77. 
Jansuz Bielecki, “Energy security: is the wolf at the door?” The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 
vol.42, no.2 (2002): p. 236. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Lee, “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil,” pp. 77-78. 
83 Chen Shaofeng, “Motivations Behind China’s Foreign Oil Quest: A Perspective from the Chinese 
Government and the Oil Companies,” Journal of Chinese Political Science Studies, vol.13, no.1 (2008): p. 81. 
84 Lee, “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil,” p. 78. 
 Kreft, “China’s Quest for Energy,” p. 64. 
85 Lee, “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil,” p. 78. 
86 Ibid., pp. 78-79. 
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and national interest to be interdependent entities.87 Due to the heavy handedness of the state 
in China’s economy, particularly in the energy sector, commercial decision-making is 
situated within a structure that ingrains the dominance of SOEs which are influenced by the 
CCP.88 Thus, in such a politicised economic system the PRC, especially with regards to 
hydrocarbon resources, does not rely entirely on the markets to determine supply, pricing and 
distribution.89 
Following the establishment of China as a net-oil importer in 1993, Beijing reorganised its oil 
and gas assets into three state-owned firms, namely the China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) and China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). These SOEs dominate onshore and offshore 
oil activity in the country’s oil sector.90 Their domination of China’s energy sector is not only 
ensured through the, exclusive access to oil assets, and the development and distribution of 
fuel resources, but also through financing arrangements with state-owned banks that provide 
cheap and plentiful credit to SOEs.91 Although Beijing’s national energy companies (NECs) 
are encouraged to behave as profit-seeking entities, China’s energy firms are essentially 
considered to be extended arms of the government as their assets are held by the State Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) which is controlled by, and 
answerable to, the upper echelons of China’s administrative and legislative body – the State 
Council of the National People’s Congress.92 Thus, the higher strategic objectives of the 
country’s SOEs are determined by CCP leaders.93 The CCP’s ability to influence, “shape, and 
execute energy policy,” is further strengthened when one notes that senior managers or 
executives of China’s NECs are all present or past members of the CCP.94 Furthermore, the 
                                                          
87 Lee, “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil,” p. 79. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid., p. 81. 
This becomes evident when one takes into consideration that these three SOEs are amongst the 10 largest 
corporations in China with a collective market capitalisation of approximately $500 billion. - Lee, “China’s 
Geostrategic Search for Oil,” p. 81. 
91 Lee, “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil,” p. 81. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid., p. 82. 
“The president and party secretary of CNPC is Jiang Jiemin, a former deputy governor of Qinghai Province. The 
president and party secretary of CNOOC is Fu Chengyu, a member of the CCP’s Central Discipline Committee. 
Fu’s predecessor at CNOOC was Wei Liucheng, who was subsequently appointed as the committee secretary of 
Hainan, the province’s highest political post. The president of Sinopec, Su Shulin, was previously the vice 
minister of Liaoning Province.” – Lee, “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil,” p. 82. 
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maintenance of such influence is ensured by restricting private sector enterprises from 
assuming major roles in the energy sector. As a result, business decisions remain largely 
subject to political interests. 
Essentially, unlike Western nations who subscribe to a liberal economic perspective that 
prescribes that, economic life should be influenced by the markets as it results in better 
outcomes, namely market based pricing and a more efficient supply and distribution of 
resources.95 China’s state-centric approach towards energy security, “hedges against strictly 
market-based outcomes” by emphasising a, “CCP first mindset in the domestic market and a 
China-first mindset,” in the global oil markets.96 Simply put, efficient pricing and distribution 
takes a back seat as the PRC’s energy policy prioritises the CCP and state interests. 
2.2. China’s Oil Diplomacy 
Prior to 1993, due to China’s oil wealth, Beijing did not deem it necessary to prioritise energy 
security. However, since the dawning of the 21st century, the Chinese have come to place an 
immense emphasis on energy security as a matter of national concern. By acting on the view 
that energy security is too important to be assigned to market forces, China opted in 2003, 
under Hu Jintao’s government, to pursue a mercantilist strategy variously termed ‘going 
global’, ‘going out’ or ‘going abroad’. In line with energy mercantilism, this strategy is 
typified by an energy-centred form of diplomacy that is carried out by Beijing’s officials, as 
well as a campaign by China’s ‘big three’ energy giants to acquire overseas oil assets. Thus, 
Holslag aptly states that Beijing is pursuing a, “pragmatic mercantilist policy that combines a 
wide array of diplomatic and economic devices”97 hence the term ‘oil diplomacy’. 
The definition of oil diplomacy is essentially similar to that of energy mercantilism. 
According to Shaofeng, oil diplomacy is defined as, “foreign activities with explicit 
involvement of the central government aiming to secure foreign oil and gas resources to 
promote interstate oil and gas business cooperation.”98 Oil diplomacy differs from oil and gas 
trade, “in terms of the major players involved in business cooperation, the principal 
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objectives, and the specific transaction methods.”99 Oil and gas trade, in purely economic 
terms, is profit-orientated and business deals are negotiated on a firm-to-firm basis with a 
cost-benefit analysis.100 The direct involvement of government is mostly unheard of. 
However, oil diplomacy is typified by governmental interference and thus, aside from purely 
commercial interests, oil diplomacy takes into consideration other economic concerns, for 
example: ensuring oil supply security, expanding a state’s scope of influence and the 
improvement of inter-state relations.101 Thus, although oil and gas trade is one of the primary 
goals of oil diplomacy, it may be utilised to serve other purposes, hence its mercantilist 
nature. 
China’s oil diplomacy consists of three stages:102 firstly, the Chinese government seeks to 
build ties with various energy rich countries to ‘open the doors’ for their NOCs to negotiate 
energy arrangements. Secondly, Beijing’s NOCs take advantage of the inroads created for 
them by accumulating upstream (crude oil exploration and extraction/production) and 
downstream (refinement and distribution of crude oil) deals. Thirdly, as state-owned energy 
firms seize opportunities created for them by the government, China continues to politically 
and financially support its NOCs. Financially, this is usually in the form of special loans (i.e. 
loans at below market rates or without interest are issued by state-owned banks) that are 
granted to energy companies for overseas energy acquisitions.103 In addition, Beijing 
indirectly supports its NECs by providing an array of incentives to nations in an effort to 
encourage that energy investing opportunities be given to Chinese NOCs. These incentives 
are usually in the form of foreign aid, infrastructural development, and trade and arms 
agreements. Politically, Beijing assists its NOCs by arranging official meetings between 
Chinese leaders and heads from energy-producing nations to negotiate over specific energy 
deals and the utilisation of the PRC’s various memberships in international organisations to 
promote the interests of energy producers.104 With considerable variation across regions, 
China has employed most of these tactics to aid its NECs in their global energy acquisition 
efforts.105 
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In order to improve China’s oil security, Beijing’s bilateral oil diplomacy has prioritised the 
gain of a more secure control over foreign oil supplies and the geographical diversification of 
imports. Although the Middle East is the PRC’s main oil source, due to the region’s 
instability and the Iraq War China believes that becoming too dependent on this part of the 
world to fulfil its oil needs could jeopardise Beijing’s oil security. Therefore, Beijing has 
sought to aggressively diversify its import sources. This has resulted in China’s oil diplomacy 
targeting countries all over the globe, including those shunned by Western oil companies.106 
Beijing has defined three strategic areas for oil exploration and production, namely 
Russia/Central Asia, Middle East/North Africa and South America.107 
With assistance from China’s state-owned banks in 2011, Chinese NOCs had stakes in more 
than 200 energy projects across 50 countries with an approximate value of $80 billion.108 The 
expansion of China’s international energy ventures has provided it with noteworthy strategic 
opportunities. In a relatively short period of time, China has, by providing an alternative to 
the dominant external influences of the West, emerged as a significant economic and political 
actor in Latin America and Africa.109 In the Middle East, Beijing is not seen to be a risk-
averse investor in the cases of Iraq and Iran. Moreover, China has improved its relationship 
with traditionally pro-American states such as Saudi Arabia.110 With regards to Russia and 
Central Asia, the oil and gas infrastructure and proposed pipeline projects that link the PRC 
to its energy rich neighbours has inevitably led China to regionally extend its geopolitical 
interests and influence.111 
Like many other energy dependent nations, Beijing holds the view that availability, reliability 
and affordability are essential for ensuring energy security.112 However, unlike other states 
that rely on the markets for energy supplies, the PRC, due to several factors, remains 
distrustful of the markets to meet its energy requirements. The popular perception amongst 
the Chinese is that, owing to the dominance of Western states in international oil markets, 
Beijing’s NOCs are presented with limited opportunities. Moreover, as a result of the West’s 
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longstanding history in the oil-importing industry, Western nations are more experienced than 
China in international energy dealings and, therefore, a majority of the world’s most viable 
oil reserves are under the control of Western multinational oil companies (MOCs).113 The 
PRC views its relatively disadvantaged position in the international oil industry as an obstacle 
to ensuring its oil security. Moreover, influenced by its perceptions of an unfair international 
energy market, China believes that international oil prices are determined by market 
mechanisms that are, “manipulated by the West, speculated by hedge funds and agitated by 
price volatility.”114 As such, Beijing has avoided relying entirely on the global oil market to 
ensure its oil supply. Aside from deeming the markets to be in favour of Western nations, 
China also reasons that, due to a potential decline in oil supply, price instability or supply 
disruptions, its unilateral energy procurement initiatives are considered to be legitimately 
substantiated. 
Since Beijing’s ‘going out’ strategy involves efforts from both its NOCs and national 
government, the PRC’s plan for securing oil supplies is essentially a mercantilist strategy that 
reinforces the nexus between China’s government and its business sector.115 As a result, 
Beijing’s energy strategy creates some confusion as it is not entirely clear whether an energy 
investment by one of China’s three NOCs is purely based on commercial reasoning or the 
PRC’s foreign policy interests, or both.116 Thus, China’s NOCs are considered to be an, 
                                                          
113 Shaofeng, “Motivations Behind China’s Foreign Oil Quest: A Perspective from the Chinese Government and 
the Oil Companies,” p. 85. 
114 Ibid. 
For a more grounding outlook on the unfairness of the international energy market, see:  
Xu Qinhua, “Global Energy Security: China’s Energy Diplomacy and its Implications for Global Energy 
Security,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES): Dialogue on Globalisation, Briefing Paper 13 (2007): p. 6. Accessed: 
03 April 2013, URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04763.pdf 
Chinese perceptions of the international oil market being dominated by the West were strengthened when the 
US Congress blocked CNOOC from buying Union Oil Company of California (UNCOAL) due to fears that 
China’s purchase of UNCOAL would threaten national security. This left Chinese analysts questioning if the US 
was really committed to upholding market principles in the international energy arena. Stemming from the 
UNCOAL debacle, Chinese analysts assert that Washington confirmed that, “its policies are driven by 
mercantilist principles that it regularly [denounces] China for pursuing.” – Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther, 
China Oil and Global Politics, p. 107. 
115 David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, “China’s Global Hunt for Energy,” Foreign Affairs, vol.84, no.5 (2005): p. 27. 
116 Canning, “Pursuit of the Pariah: Iran, Sudan and Myanmar in China’s Energy Security Strategy,” p. 49. 
Zha Daojiong, “China’s Energy Security: Domestic and International Issues,” Survival, vol.48, no.1 (2006): p. 
182. 
China is securing deals with offerings that only the state can provide, i.e. the dispensation of soft loans and 
credit lines, development assistance, military aid, diplomatic support and access to the PRC’s expanding 
markets. For more examples of “sweeteners” that China is using to gain access to foreign energy assets see:  
Canning, “Pursuit of the Pariah: Iran, Sudan and Myanmar in China’s Energy Security Strategy,” p. 49. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
25 
 
“unusual agglomeration of modern entrepreneurial talent striving for earnings growth and 
ever-greater profitability, whilst at the same time remaining arms of government, increasingly 
focused on shaping energy policy to meet national strategic economic goals.”117 
Unlike private firms which prioritise commercial interests over domestic factors, Chinese 
NOCs, whilst minimising potential risks, try to synergise all potential benefits.118 Due to the 
state’s involvement in its NOCs’ oil dealings, political considerations sometimes outweigh 
commercial viability. When a potential deal is commercially unfeasible but could produce 
substantial political benefits, Beijing’s NOCs, propped up by government, may advance with 
the deal irrespective of the economic costs.119 This is exemplified by CNPC’s decision in 
1997 to outbid various oil firms for a 60 percent stake in Kazakhstan’s state-owned 
Aktyubinsk Oil Company and the right to develop the Uzen oil field, the second largest oil 
field in Kazakhstan.120 Motivated by the stability that these energy arrangements could bring 
to China’s Xinjian Province,121 the CCP urged the CNPC to agree to build a pipeline from 
Kazakhstan to China. Despite doubts about the feasibility of this pipeline, the CNPC 
proceeded with drafting up China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline plans. Apparently, the CNPC 
overpaid by as much as 30 percent for the Aktyubinsk Oil Company and Uzen field.122  
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Although numerous Chinese foreign policy advisors assert that the creation of stronger 
economic ties between China and oil abundant states can assist in ensuring their country’s 
access to energy resources, oil diplomacy may not guarantee Beijing protection from oil price 
hikes.123 By drawing on the 1970s, Downs points out that oil-importing countries learnt that 
‘special relationships’ with oil exporters are rendered useless during a crisis as each nation 
becomes primarily concerned with securing their oil supplies.124 Nevertheless, as noted by 
Shaofeng 125, some supporters of oil diplomacy believe that producing oil abroad (under the 
control of Chinese NOCs) and then exporting it directly to China has the merits of cost 
efficiency and risk reduction. Contrary to this line of reasoning, based on, “strong anecdotal 
evidence from 2008-2010,” Lee highlights that under benign conditions, instead of shipping 
private oil supplies directly to China, Chinese NOCs sold a significant amount of their equity 
oil on domestic and global markets.126 This is considered to be a rational move as, when the 
shipment costs of equity oil and third party refiners (China’s refineries cannot handle large 
amounts of oil) are taken into consideration, purchasing oil on the international markets is a 
lot cheaper.127  
In this context siding with the international market makes more sense than choosing the 
equity route. Yet, when taking into consideration potential disruptions that could affect global 
commodity markets, offshore equity oil provides China with the flexibility of hedging or 
circumventing international markets.128 Seeming to align with this view, the Chinese posit 
that gaining more control over foreign oil sources is a better option than relying on the market 
as it provides China with a greater capacity to insulate itself from oil price hikes.129 Having 
learnt from the oil shortages that were incurred after the Sino-Soviet break up in the 1960s, 
Beijing is aware that depending on others to ensure its oil supply will expose the PRC to, 
“external vulnerabilities and risks brought about by rival interruptions, regional turmoil, 
terrorist attacks and so forth.”130 Due to this reasoning, China is persevering in fortifying its 
                                                          
123 Downs, “The Chinese Energy Security Debate,” p. 38. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Shaofeng, “Motivations Behind China’s Foreign Oil Quest: A Perspective from the Chinese Government and 
the Oil Companies,” p. 88. 
Downs, “China,” p. 37. 
126 Lee, “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil,” p. 84. 
127 Ibid., p. 84. 
128 Ibid., pp. 84-85. 
129 Shaofeng, “Motivations Behind China’s Foreign Oil Quest: A Perspective from the Chinese Government and 
the Oil Companies,” p. 90. 
130 Ibid. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
27 
 
control over foreign oil sources. However, Beijing is realising that its strategy of ‘controlling’ 
foreign oil is of limited feasibility as, instead of allowing overseas firms to own ‘their’ oil, 
present day oil markets, “prefer to contract with foreign oil companies for expertise, technical 
services and investments.”131 With regards to any potential instability that may arise in Sino-
US relations, ‘locking up’ overseas oil supplies is not an effective hedge. Due to the maritime 
transport of oil and the dominance of the American navy on trade routes, equity oil that is 
shipped to China could be cut off by the US during a war. As a result, the Chinese are keen to 
develop land routes via pipelines for oil transport. For example, Beijing was especially eager 
to develop the China-Russia oil pipeline.132 
When Beijing became a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, many 
Western nations expected the CCP to limit its role in China’s commercial activity.133 
However, especially in the energy sector, the government seems more entrenched than ever. 
This does not rest well with Western countries as the CCP’s oversight of Chinese NOC’s 
commercial activities has produced fears that China is using its oil companies as proxies to 
further Beijing’s international interests.134 The US considers Chinese state involvement in 
business arrangements to be ‘patently unfair’ as Washington has voiced that the use of SOEs 
reflects a, “centrally coordinated ‘mercantilist’ approach to international business at odds 
with global norms of free trade.”135 Additionally, Beijing’s NOCs’ relentless pursuit to own 
below-ground assets has spawned fears that China, to the detriment of other economies, will 
lock up supplies and distort global markets.136 Such fears are compounded by China’s 
political strategy of ‘cosying up’ with energy-producing countries to gain their NOCs’ 
favoured access to energy deals. Although the Chinese have sold quite an amount of their 
offshore equity oil on local and international markets, this has done little to allay suspicions 
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that China could secure massive amounts of equity oil which may potentially disrupt future 
market supplies.137 However, Beijing’s ability to achieve this is, “far less significant than 
some alarmists’ views imply.”138 For China’s ‘locking-up’ strategy to substantially impact 
international markets, Chinese NOCs would have to dominate, “the largest Middle-Eastern 
players by controlling oil assets in countries such as Saudi Arabia.”139 As a result of the 
geopolitical ramifications and economic turmoil that would result from allowing one importer 
to accumulate significant quantities of oil, Middle-Eastern countries are wary of granting 
China equity arrangements.140 Nevertheless, the fear that China’s aggressive energy 
accumulation efforts will increase other nations’ energy insecurity still persists. In an attempt 
to influence Beijing to pursue energy resources in a cooperative manner instead of a ‘winner 
takes all’ or zero-sum stance, an invitation to join the International Energy Agency (IEA) was 
extended to China. However, it has been speculated that by viewing multilateral cooperation 
as a cover for advancing Western interests and since Beijing would have to be more 
transparent about its energy dealings, China declined to become a member of the IEA. 
In spite of the West’s disapproval of China’s oil diplomacy it appears that, due to Beijing’s 
unwillingness to leave its energy security in the hands of the international market, the 
Chinese will continue to bypass the market and pursue bilateral energy arrangements. China 
is essentially pursuing the same strategy that the US, Britain, France and Japan utilised in the 
1970s and 1980s. Thus, protests from Washington that Beijing is attempting to amass future 
global oil supplies are hypocritical, “since this is exactly what British and US companies 
attempted to do in the past.”141 Moreover, due to the inequality of the global energy market 
and China’s relative inexperience in international energy dealings, Beijing seems to be 
justified in guiding and assisting its NOCs in expanding their international outreach.142 
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2.2.1. Pursuit of the Pariah 
Due to its delayed development in the international energy market, and seeing as most of the 
main oil markets are dominated by Western companies, China’s oil firms have found it 
challenging to assert themselves amongst intense competition from Western MOCs.143 With 
the odds stacked against them, Chinese NOCs struggle to secure oil deals in favourable areas. 
As a result, Beijing’s international oil accumulation drive has targeted countries where 
Western MOCs cannot intensely challenge the PRC’s oil companies. In line with the notion 
of comparative advantage, China pursues countries that Washington highly condemns and 
which are, in many cases, placed under unilateral oil sanctions. Due to Western firms 
withdrawing from countries that are placed under sanctions, it makes it easier for China to 
pursue oil supplies in such states, as Beijing is not legally obligated to adhere to unilateral 
sanctions. As a result, the Chinese have struck oil agreements and various other energy 
resource deals with countries such as Sudan, Myanmar, Iran, Libya, Uzbekistan and 
Venezuela – all states that have dubious domestic policies and foreign outlooks that 
contradict the Western perspective.144  
Beijing’s interactions with politically isolated states (that are eager to seize the opportunities 
that the Chinese markets present) have raised Western, especially American, suspicions.145 
Since most of Washington’s isolation efforts target states that have questionable domestic 
policies, a lack of respect for human rights, poor international law adherence and intentions 
for nuclear proliferation, Beijing’s moral compass is under scrutiny as, in pursuit of energy 
assets, China counters the West’s attempts to isolate dubious states. By providing 
internationally condemned countries with political cover and an economic lifeline that is free 
of governance or reform conditions, Beijing essentially undermines the reformative efforts 
that are directed at rogue states.146 Due to the comparative advantage that pariah states offer 
China, it is unlikely that Beijing would relinquish such a benefit as, “whenever and wherever 
there are significant energy assets for sale, there are few political, diplomatic, commercial or 
ethical issues preventing Chinese NOCs from bidding.”147 Beijing’s continued engagement 
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with rogue states strains the PRC’s efforts to be viewed as a responsible global power. Aware 
of this, former US Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick, in September 2005 played the 
‘responsible stakeholder’ card in an attempt to persuade China to cooperate in formulating 
policies towards pariah states in return for America’s recognition of its rise.148 However, as a 
result of China’s piecemeal actions against pariah states, it appears that Beijing is not 
desperate for Washington’s acknowledgement of its ascendency. Instead, China has chosen to 
stick to the middle road, so as to avoid endangering its energy interests in US condemned 
states.149 Furthermore, hard-liners that are opposed to the US’s global dominance reason that 
maintaining support of pariah regimes serves to counter Washington’s power.150 In order to 
avoid undermining its vital economic interests with America, Beijing has been circumspect in 
its dealings with pariah states. Thus, although China will continue to set its own international 
agenda, Washington and other concerned parties can play a vital role in influencing Beijing’s 
interactions with internationally condemned states.151 
If the West wants China to ‘toe the line’ and help modify the behaviour of pariah states, 
countries will have to establish a realistic outlook of when and how the PRC is likely to assist 
in cajoling rogue states to embrace international norms.152 According to Kleine-Ahlbrandt 
and Small this means that states, particularly Western nations, will have to develop a clear 
sense of how their objectives are in line with, or deviate from, China’s interests.153 Thus, in 
part, the international community will have to accept that cooperation with Beijing over 
pariah states will sometimes come at a cost. For example, states may have to consent to 
allowing dubious regimes an extended lease on life by limiting or minimising coercive 
measures against them.154 As such, “China’s ability to assume a greater role as a broker 
between pariah states a d the international community means that it can define the bottom 
line in negotiations.”155 However, drawing on Beijing’s past interactions with pariah 
countries, it seems that China will resort to the bare minimum in order to steer clear of, 
“acute instability or sustained international opprobrium.”156 Although the inadequate 
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economic and political reform that Beijing encourages amongst pariah states may be 
frustrating for Western nations – due to the West’s limited diplomatic influence and 
economic leverage over internationally shunned nations – Western nations realise that owing 
to China’s unique influence over and insight into the intentions of rogue state leaders, 
Beijing’s privileged ties with pariah countries may be (if China wishes to do so) manipulated 
to compel rogue states to align themselves with international norms.157 
In conclusion, it has become increasingly clear that Beijing favours a mercantilist modus 
operandi for obtaining energy resources. The PRC’s preference for securing equity 
agreements, as opposed to relying extensively on global energy markets for fuel resources, 
points out that China subscribes to an energy mercantilist strategy for accumulating 
hydrocarbon, particularly oil supplies. This notion is further supported by the state-centred 
structure of China’s energy sector and the heavy influence that the CCP has over the 
country’s NOCs. Furthermore, by relying heavily on incentives that can only be utilised by 
the state, China’s ‘going-out’ strategy depicts the major role that the Chinese government 
plays in assisting its NOCs with obtaining lucrative oil deals.  
Although China’s mercantilist oil strategy deviates from liberal norms of free trade and thus 
impinges on the market’s ability to serve as an effective pricing mechanism and distributor of 
energy supplies, Chinese motivation behind their pursuit of energy-equity through 
mercantilist means is coloured by their worldview. This view posits that the international 
energy markets work in favour of developed (especially Western) nations; therefore Chinese 
equity initiatives (which hedge against market disruptions and price hikes) provide the CCP 
with the best opportunity for securing and safeguarding a continuous supply of oil to its 
shores. In addition, stemming from its mercantilist outlook on energy procurement (which is 
considered to be a zero-sum game), China has not hesitated to engage with well-endowed 
energy pariah states, especially since such states offer Chinese NECs little competition from 
Western energy companies. Beijing’s interaction with politically isolated nations has led the 
international community to question China’s moral standing as, unlike the US, it has done 
very little to encourage pariah states to embrace international political and economic norms. 
It seems that in its relentless pursuit of energy resources, Western-voiced disapproval of 
Beijing’s maintenance of ties with pariah states has largely been an exercise in futility. 
However, aware that its drive for continued economic prosperity depends to a large extent on 
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remaining in favour with the US, Beijing has, in sticking to its middle-of-the-road approach, 
treaded cautiously with pariah states such as Iran. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Sino-Iranian Relationship 
Due to the multi-dimensional and ever-changing nature of Sino-Iranian relations it would be 
impossible to cover every facet of Beijing-Tehran ties in this chapter. Therefore, this chapter 
will focus on what are considered to be the more prominent aspects of the relationship that 
ties Beijing and Tehran together despite the international pressure placed on China to 
implement measures to further isolate Iran for its defiant nuclear activities. This chapter will 
analyse the Sino-Iranian relationship from three points of view, namely trade, energy and 
geostrategic reasoning. These three factors have been chosen as, based on the literature 
reviewed, they appear to be the ‘glue’ that binds these two countries together. 
In spite of periods when relations were strained, Sino-Iranian ties have gradually evolved into 
a sturdy relationship. This relationship is strengthened by the historical commonalities 
between the two nations, namely that both consider themselves to be heirs of once great 
civilisations that were victimised by Western imperialists. However, aside from historical 
similarities binding China and Iran, “circumstances have conspired to make China and Iran 
well suited energy partners.”158 Chinese efforts to enhance their relations with Iran have 
mainly stemmed from China’s search for energy resources, an opportunity to create a diverse 
portfolio of overseas market shares and the desire to exert political influence in the Middle 
East. Yet, not all credit can be given to Beijing for establishing links with Tehran as Iranian 
officials have taken, “determined, consistent and effective initiatives,” to entice China to 
build a relationship with Iran.159 By advertising itself as a reliable energy source and key 
strategic partner in the Middle East, Iran has managed to gain the PRC’s attention and 
advance Sino-Iranian relations. Additionally, aside from acknowledging Tehran’s crucial role 
in the energy market, Beijing also recognises Iran’s vital geostrategic location and its 
potential to be an energy transport base between the Middle East, Central Asia, and 
Europe.160  
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Since the 1980s, Sino-Iranian relations have evolved from a focus on arm sales to one that 
encompasses commercial, energy and diplomatic dealings. This shift in relations is partly 
attributed to the international sanctions imposed on Iran, as increasing isolation has forced 
Tehran to search for alternate markets to export its energy resources. Moreover, Iranian 
leaders are aware that the geopolitics of oil has shifted from West to East, as incremental 
growth is creating a demand for oil from the three non-Western territories of China, India and 
the Middle-Eastern region. As a result, there has been a steady increase in the energy 
interdependence between Asian and Gulf States.161 Essentially, Sino-Iranian relations are 
considered to be mutually complementary or naturally symbiotic as the Chinese have a 
ballooning economy that requires hydrocarbon resources which, in turn, provides a market 
for Iran’s surplus of energy commodities.162 
3.1. Background: Sino-Iranian Ties 
The development of Sino-Iranian relations stems from a gradual expansion of ties between 
China and the Middle East. The birth of this relationship has been traced back to the second 
century BCE when the Han Dynasty of China opened up the Silk Road and established trade 
with the Parthian Empire.163 Although official diplomatic relations were established in 1971, 
Iran kept China at a distance as the US pressured Tehran to limit its interaction with 
communist Beijing. However, before his overthrow in 1979, the Shah sought to improve 
relations with China as mutual concern over Soviet actions in Asia edged the PRC and Iran to 
achieve greater cooperation. Yet, relations with China were again strained when 
revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeni (successor to the Shah), in rebellion 
against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and US, supported a foreign policy 
that was, “neither West nor East.” However, Khomeni’s suspicions of China had to be 
revised as Iran’s isolation and war with Iraq forced Tehran to cooperate a little more with 
Beijing. The Islamic Republic had come to perceive that China could be used as a 
counterbalancing mechanism against the USSR and US, thus providing Iran with much 
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needed leverage on the international stage.164 Tehran’s new outlook towards China suited 
Beijing’s global political agenda as it provided the Chinese with a gateway to pursue their 
territorial ambitions in Iran and, more importantly, the greater Middle East.165 
The endurance of the Sino-Iranian relationship is attributed to shared interests and similar 
political outlooks.166 The survival of these ties illustrates that both these nations value 
political pragmatism, strategic thinking, and economic dealings above differences in ideology 
and religion.167 However, past grievances against Western domination have also played a part 
in shaping both nations’ contemporary outlooks on global politics. With memories of 
‘victimisation’ and ‘vulnerability’ at the hands of Western imperialists etched deep into their 
psyche, Beijing and Tehran continue to protest against Western imperialism and hegemonic 
behaviour.168 As a result, both countries distrust the US and frequently criticise Washington’s 
policy of liberal interventionism as ‘imperialist’ and ‘hegemonic’.169 By acknowledging their 
historical lineage of having once been ‘great civilisations’, Beijing and Tehran draw 
inspiration from this narrative to reassert their great power status.170 This essentially fuels 
China’s, “foreign policy goals of a multi-polar world, free of US hegemony, where regional 
powers play the dominant role within their respective spheres of influence.”171 In this regard, 
Beijing and Tehran’s ambitions have remained quite similar. 
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Even though the commonalities between China and Iran portray a grounded relationship, 
‘when push comes to shove’, Beijing has, on various occasions, demonstrated that it is 
willing to sideline Iran in favour of remaining in comity with the US. This was particularly 
demonstrated when China acknowledged calls from Washington to abandon nuclear 
cooperation with Iran in 1997. Although Iran felt betrayed by China’s actions, the Ayatollahs 
realised that it was still in Tehran’s best interests to continue working with the Chinese on 
economic and political issues. Thus, it is by means of such flexibility that the Chinese and 
Iranians have created a durable, albeit limited, relationship that continues to persist under 
straining conditions.172 
Contrary to framing Sino-Iranian relations in terms of mutual cooperation, Harold and Nader 
emphasise that this relationship is characterised by a lopsided or asymmetrical dependence.173 
China has subtly conveyed that, instead of viewing Tehran as a vital strategic energy ally, 
Iran is considered to be one of several countries that it interacts with on a mercantilist 
basis.174 Although the PRC views Iran as a potential partner for limiting US advancements in 
the Middle East, Beijing is not overly reliant on Tehran for its energy needs, economic 
development or national security. This is demonstrated by China’s globally dispersed sources 
of oil and its substantial oil imports from other Middle-Eastern nations, most notably Saudi 
Arabia. On the other hand, because of Iran’s small number of allies and shunning of the US, 
Tehran has come to rely heavily on Beijing for vital diplomacy, economic, military and 
technological assistance. Although China’s dependency on Iran is minimal, Sino-Iranian 
relations have nonetheless enhanced Beijing’s capacity to become a vital player in Middle-
Eastern issues. Aware of how sanctions have heightened the Islamic Republic’s vulnerability, 
Beijing is exploiting Iran by utilising its increasing isolation from the international 
community to demand Iranian oil at discounted prices. Despite such exploitive demands, 
Tehran is not willing to dismiss the PRC, as China provides the Islamic Republic with vital 
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diplomatic cover in the international arena. Although Beijing acknowledges that its 
relationship with Tehran (a pariah state) may tarnish its image as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ 
and threaten Sino-US relations, China has nonetheless demonstrated an unusual support for 
Iran. 175 
3.2. Economic 
3.2.1. Trade 
In 1979 both nations undertook drastic reforms that laid the building blocks for their intricate 
present day economic and political relationship.176 For Iran, the Islamic Revolution and 
subsequent hostage debacle led to the deterioration of Tehran’s relationship with the West as 
it was faced with economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Whilst Beijing, under Deng 
Xiaoping, implemented market-based reforms that were followed by a rise in GDP growth 
which subsequently led to the ascendance of China as an international force. 
Sino-Iranian economic relations have grown at an annual average of 40% over the past few 
years.177 This is demonstrated by the level of trade between the two nations increasing from 
$400 million in 1994 to $29 billion in 2008.178 Although economic exchanges were first 
limited to military purchases by Iran, trade exchanges between Beijing and Tehran have 
primarily advanced through general trade and oil-gas dealings. Both nations have hosted 
various conferences that promote bilateral trade and economic cooperation. However, energy 
is, without question, the main pillar of Sino-Iranian economic ties. Due to China’s energy 
demands, bilateral trade in fuel resources rose. In addition to rising energy trade, bilateral 
trade in other goods also increased – with total bilateral interaction rising from $700 million 
in 1993 to $5.6 billion in 2003.179 Aware of Iran’s vast energy resource endowments, Beijing 
and Tehran have signed various energy deals worth millions of dollars. However, unlike 
China who mainly views Iran as an energy source and another market for Chinese goods, the 
Iranians highly value Chinese patronage. The PRC has come to be indispensible to the 
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Iranian economy as it is considered to be an important energy customer, a source of 
technological knowledge, and a major investor in a variety of Iranian sectors. 180 
Though energy trade dominates Sino-Iranian relations, it has become evident that both 
nations are interested in expanding economic dealings to incorporate various other sectors. In 
efforts to expand the Sino-Iranian relationship beyond energy, the two nations established the 
Chinese-Iranian Joint Commission on Economic, Trade, Scientific, and Technical 
Cooperation in 1993.181 This keen interest in diversifying relations became particularly 
evident in 2005 when Beijing expressed interest in strengthening labour ties between the two 
nations and the possibility of initiating cooperation with regards to aerospace ventures.182 
However, it was a signed aluminium deal worth $1 billion that significantly demonstrated 
China’s interests in diversifying its relations with Iran.183 Additionally, China’s desire to 
dabble in different Iranian sectors was again demonstrated at the 2009 Iran-China Economic 
Cooperation Conference, where many Chinese companies finalised negotiations and signed 
agreements to improve Iranian infrastructure and the country’s mining and construction 
industries.184 More recently, in the wake of sanctions issued against the Islamic Republic, 
China displayed its keenness to expand its interests in the country when Beijing signed a $20 
billion agreement in May 2011 to boost bilateral cooperation in Iran’s industrial and mining 
sectors.185 
The Iranian market is considered to be extremely profitable for China as, “the abundant 
natural resources, big market, geographic location and educated workforce,” are 
advantageous factors that have enticed Beijing to engage with Tehran.186 This is echoed by 
the estimated 250 Chinese companies involved in a variety of projects or retailing in low-cost 
consumer products in Iran.187 Moreover, due to the positives of trading with Iran, the two 
countries have announced that they plan to more than double their annual bilateral trade from 
$30-$40 billion to $100 billion by 2016.188 China’s growing economic influence and the 
effects of sanctions have altered Iran’s trading patterns – Tehran has become increasingly 
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dependent on China both as a market and as a source of consumer and industrial goods.189 
This plays to Beijing’s advantage in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI). Due to the 
Islamic Republic’s strained relations with the West, Iran, in terms of FDI, offers China little 
competition. Additionally, there has been an increase in China’s exports to Iran which, since 
2001, have increased nearly sixteenfold to $12.2 billion.190 Such improvements in Chinese-
Iranian commercial dealings led China to surpass the European Union (EU) in 2009 to 
become Iran’s largest trading partner, with a bilateral trade volume estimated at more than 
$21 billion.191 
Although the Sino-Iranian economic relationship has evolved to become highly robust, China 
and Iran have, “yet to fully exploit their economic potential in various [other] spheres” as the 
regulatory framework underpinning this relationship requires substantial improvements.192 It 
has been suggested that the Sino-Iranian economic relationship could be enhanced with the 
signing of a customs agreement and the co-ordination of import and export regulations 
between the two nations.193 In addition, due to financial and banking obstacles hindering 
deals from moving forward, China and Iran need to establish a legal arbitration board for 
bilateral disagreements.194 Owing to the, “unpredictable pricing and contractual terms that 
often come with political strings attached,” observers have speculated that Iran’s strenuous 
business climate could possibly influence China to rely more on Saudi Arabia to meet its 
energy demands.195 Nevertheless, for now Iran continues to be a key piece in China’s foreign 
economic-energy puzzle. 
3.2.2. Energy 
As OPEC’s (Oil Producing Export Countries) second largest oil exporter, Iran produces 3.7 
million barrels of crude oil per day and is ranked as the world’s fourth-largest oil producer.196 
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Furthermore, the country has oil reserves collectively estimated at 155 billion barrels and gas 
reserves at 33 trillion cubic metres.197 Thus, it is not surprising that energy driven China has 
developed a keen interest in Tehran’s energy sector. 
Although energy in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG) has provided a second energy 
link with Iran, Iranian crude is still the main attraction. Ever since China’s first purchase of 
Iranian oil in 1974 under the Shah’s regime, the PRC’s oil imports from Iran have grown 
substantially.198 Within a space of two years, oil imports from Iran increased from seven 
million tons in 2000 to eleven million tons in 2002.199 As a result of this marked increase in 
Iranian oil imports, Iran was positioned in 2003 as the second largest oil exporter to China, 
after Saudi Arabia.200 In addition, the oil connection between the two nations was further 
reiterated in 2009 when the PRC surpassed Japan to become Iran’s top oil customer.201 
Iranian crude oil accounts for approximately 10-15 percent of China’s total oil imports.202  
Although this percentage is miniscule when compared to Saudi Arabia and Angola, the 
Chinese have calculated reasons for importing Iranian oil. Crude oil from Iran not only assists 
in meeting rapidly increasing Chinese consumption demands, it also helps contain rising 
import expenses as the sour crude oil (sulphur-rich) found in Iran is comparatively cheaper 
than sweet crude (carbon-rich).203 Moreover, access to Iranian oil is gaining importance as 
Iran provides China with an opportunity to access its oil reserves without competition from 
Western oil companies.204 Iran is also one of the few Middle-Eastern states that permit China 
to carry out business in upstream sectors.205 This demonstrates how, by being amongst a few 
Middle East countries that allow Chinese NOCs to carry out upstream ventures, Tehran is 
using its energy reserves to strengthen its partnership with Beijing and fortify its position as 
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an important regional player.206 Aside from upstream developments, Chinese NOCs have also 
shown a strong interest in downstream developments. This has resulted in more than one 
hundred Chinese companies operating in Iran to develop the metro, ports, airports, and oil 
and natural gas facilities.207 Essentially, in efforts to improve the future of China’s energy 
security, upstream and downstream projects are a part of Beijing’s plan to internationalise its 
NOCs and gain equity stakes in production.208 
Despite Iran barring foreign oil companies from concession agreements and restricting them 
to ‘buy back’ contracts, Chinese NOCs, unlike many other international oil companies, are 
not deterred by Tehran’s approach to dealing with overseas energy firms.209 China’s 
increasing focus on the Iranian energy sector is demonstrated by the 166 Chinese companies 
that attended the Iranian Oil Show in 2011, as opposed to the one hundred firms that attended 
in 2010.210 Moreover, aside from signing numerous energy agreements, Iran has also formed 
a joint oil and gas committee with China to advance energy cooperation. Apart from 
purchasing Iranian crude oil and gas, Beijing (after Japan’s withdrawal from deals due to US 
pressure) has, by securing the massive Azadegan and Yadvaran oil and gas fields, become a 
formidable player in Iranian upstream operations.211 
Although China has acquired numerous Iranian fuel agreements, Iran’s energy sector has 
presented Beijing with various challenges. Tehran traditionally restricts foreign ownership of 
its hydrocarbon resources and, due to this, China has been provided with limited 
opportunities to acquire equity in Iranian oil.212 Like its Western and Japanese counterparts, 
Chinese investors are prone to becoming frustrated with Iran’s approach to drafting contracts 
and business dealings, as possible ventures usually involve continuous rounds of back and 
forth negotiations and unimplemented business deals.213 Nevertheless, such irritations have 
not hindered China from filling the void that sanctions have created in Tehran’s energy 
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sector. Due to being wary of fines under the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), various companies 
have withdrawn from the Islamic Republic as numerous businesses believe that the, “political 
and public relation problems more than outweigh business rewards.”214 By viewing the pull 
out of Western companies as an opportunity to gain a stronger foothold in the Iranian energy 
sector, the Chinese have seized this opening by signing various energy deals, particularly 
during 2005 to 2010.215 Energy related agreements signed during this period are estimated to 
be worth $120 billion.216 Investments of note include a $40 billion deal to update the Iranian 
petroleum refining industry, a $2 billion Sinopec Group agreement to develop the Yadavaran 
oil field and an additional $70 billion in assistance directed towards the development of the 
Yadavaran oil field in exchange for 10 million tons of LNG from Iran.217 
Despite fortifying Sino-Iranian relations with economic-energy agreements, in light of Iran’s 
outdated energy infrastructure analysts are still left with technical difficulties in terms of 
deciphering how successfully energy agreements are being implemented towards meeting 
China’s energy needs.218 As a result of the numerous energy contracts that have been initiated 
between the two nations, the Islamic Republic has subsequently been provided with cover to 
weather sanctions that target its energy sector.219 However, the ‘life jacket’ that Beijing 
provides Tehran’s energy sector can easily be revoked. Due to, “the challenges and potential 
political backlash” linked with conducting business in Iran, most Sino-Iranian agreements are 
in the, “form of non-binding memoranda of understanding which are easily revocable in the 
event of political, economic, or internal instability”.220 
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Taking into consideration the damage that UN sanctions and unilateral measures have 
inflicted on Iran’s economy, Tehran views Beijing as a lifeline now more than ever. China is 
considered to be a strong economic partner that is capable of providing the crucial investment 
and technology that is need for Iran’s economic development. On the energy front, Beijing’s 
vested interests in Tehran’s energy sector are vital as Iran lacks the necessary expertise and 
capital to modernise its declining energy industry, especially its oil refining capabilities.221 
Until recently, Tehran did not possess the refining capabilities to meet domestic oil needs, 
thus Iran had to import approximately 40 percent of its refined oil to meet demands.222 
However, with sanctions limiting refined oil exports to the country, Iran was forced to expand 
its oil refining capacity. Despite needing more than $100 billion in investments to maintain 
and modernise its oil production capacity, Iranian officials are wary of granting foreign firms 
overly generous access to their energy resources.223 Thus, Downs states that the, “Iranians 
themselves have been more effective in deterring investment in their oil sector than US 
sanctions.”224 However, by appealing to its dominant energy beneficiary, China increased 
fuel shipments to the Islamic Republic and is aiding Iran with its refining expansion 
efforts.225 Assisting Iran has provided the Chinese with an opportunity to expand their foreign 
investment and a chance to enter Tehran’s ‘good books’ for securing future oil supplies.226 
Since the Chinese are essentially keeping the Iranian energy sector afloat, Molavi suggests 
that the Sino-Iranian relationship seems to be more vital for Tehran than Beijing.227 By 
playing on this asymmetrical dependence, Chinese firms have asserted that if there are 
hindrances that prevent China’s Iranian projects from obtaining attractive profits, they will 
revert to a peripheral position in the country’s energy sector.228 
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Despite the seemingly anchored Sino-Iranian economic-energy relationship, major Chinese 
NECs have been stalling the implementation of agreements in Iran in the face of sanctions 
against Tehran. However, there has been no clear indication if the decision to delay the 
implementation of energy deals is a directive from the Chinese government or based on 
Chinese NECs’ wariness of proceeding with energy plans in a high-risk environment. Harold 
and Nader suggest that firms are individually weighing up the risks to avoid a Libyan 
scenario, where analysts forecasted that a democratic Libya would potentially cost China 
$18.8 billion in investments.229 While awaiting the outcome of the Obama Administration’s 
deliberation regarding the possibility of sanctioning Chinese firms under the Comprehensive 
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestments Act of 2010 (CISADA), China delayed the 
implementation of an estimated $40 billion in 2010 investments to revamp Iran’s petroleum 
industry.230 Thus, of the $40 billion, China, in 2011, had so far only provided less than $3 
billion.231 If a high risk business environment is behind Chinese NECs reluctance to 
implement decisions it can be assumed that, once Tehran gains a more favourable 
international status, China is likely to advance the implementation of agreements in order to 
avoid competition from other countries who may want to re-engage with Iran.232 
3.3. Geostrategic: Countering US Hegemony in the Middle East 
In terms of geostrategic reasoning the Islamic Republic is of major importance to China. Iran 
stands out mainly because it is the largest and most populous Islamic country in the oil 
abundant Middle East.233 Moreover, due to its strategic location, geographical land mass and 
human resources, Iran is considered to be a regional power in the Middle East. The Islamic 
Republic is deemed to be geostrategically imperative because:234 firstly, Iran has a stretching 
coastline on the North Arabian Sea which dominates the entire eastern side of the Persian 
Gulf. Secondly, the Islamic Republic has lengthy borders with Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. Furthermore, Iran also borders on some of the remaining republics of the former 
Soviet Union, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Lastly, towards the North of 
Iran, the country also has a coastline on the Caspian Sea and shares borders with states in the 
Central Asian region. 
                                                          
229 Harold and Nader, China and Iran: Economic, Political and Military Relations, p. 12. 
230 Salvin, “Iran turns to China, Barter to Survive Sanctions,” p. 3. 
231 Ibid., p. 4. 
232 Harold and Nader, China and Iran: Economic, Political and Military Relations, p. 12. 
233 Jun and Lei, “Key Issues in China-Iran Relations,” p. 50. 
234 Ibid. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
45 
 
Taking these geostrategic factors into account and the country’s potential as a regional power, 
in the 1970s Washington considered Iran to be a ‘strategic pillar’ in America’s grand strategy 
for Western Asia.235 However, with the ousting of the Shah in 1979 and the Iranian hostage 
crisis, the US revised its views of Iran and deduced that the country was to be considered a 
‘strategic threat’.236 Over the years, Washington’s aversion towards Tehran has been 
demonstrated by the numerous unilateral sanctions against the country and speeches by 
American officials that deem the country to be a ‘pariah’ state and part of the ‘axis of evil’. 
As such, the Americans have strategically established an expansive military and naval 
presence in the Middle East in order to protect their oil investments, to insure regional 
stability and, most importantly, to serve as a warning to Iran.237 However, “the military 
implementation of the Bush administration’s unilateralist foreign policy” has produced 
significant changes in geostrategic alliances.238 This is particularly demonstrated by the 
strengthened Sino-Iranian relationship. 
China perceives that America’s policy towards the Middle East and its established military 
presence serves to bolster the US’s dominance in the region.239 Stemming from Beijing’s 
desire for a multi-polar world and its opposition to the US’s hegemonic influence in the Arab 
world, a part of China’s foreign policy towards the Middle East is, from a realist-mercantilist 
perspective, based on opposing American hegemony in the area.240 Beijing strongly favours 
multi-polarity because the PRC, “believes that a regional and international environment in 
which the US is obliged to accept the diversity of political and social systems best serves 
China’s interests.”241 Such thinking could possibly stem from Beijing’s anxiety over 
Washington’s ability to control strategic global areas and its potential to cut off energy 
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supplies to China in the event of a military conflict, possibly over Taiwan.242 Additionally, 
Chinese analysts are concerned with Washington’s potential to utilise its hegemonic status to 
assert control over oil resources that could be used as leverage to coerce major oil consumers, 
since, “once you control the gulf, you control Europe, Japan and China, like holding the tap 
in your hands.”243 Thus, oil is more than just a fuel resource, it is a power tool. 
However, without any strong historical ties or a longstanding strategic interest in the region, 
China’s mission to ‘chip away’ at American dominance in the Middle East is hampered. Thus 
Beijing has avoided directly challenging the US’s hegemonic position. Instead, the PRC is 
indirectly working towards minimising America’s strong influence in the area by supporting 
or building relationships with regimes that have an aversion towards the US’s presence in the 
Middle East.244 In this regard, Iran is considered to be an ideal partner for China. Aware of 
the Islamic Republic’s emergence as a regional power, geostrategic location, distaste of 
America’s influence in the region and, most importantly, Iran’s shared view of a multi-polar 
world, Beijing has sought to forge sturdy economic, diplomatic and military ties with Tehran 
to counterbalance US power in the Middle East. 
Since American-Gulf alliances have established a security regime that is in line with the US’s 
interests in the Middle East,245 China has been prompted to pursue substantial military and 
defence relations with Iran. The Chinese strategically reason that assisting Iran with military 
improvements indirectly counterbalances US dominance in the Persian Gulf.246 Furthermore, 
there have been suggestions that Beijing may eventually propose to enter into a formal 
defence relationship with Iran247 but, due to the negative implications that such an agreement 
would have on China’s relations with the US, the Arab world and Israel, a Sino-Iranian 
defence relationship seems improbable. Nevertheless, this does not mean that geopolitical 
cooperation between China and Iran is stunted. On the contrary, geostrategic collaboration 
between these two nations can continue to advance, despite the absence of a formal defence 
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agreement.248 Chinese analysts advocate that Beijing’s efforts to strengthen ties with Iran 
could serve as a, hedge to prevent Iran from succumbing to American influences in the 
future, especially if the Islamic Republic’s current regime is overthrown and replaced with a 
more pro-American government.249 However, China and Iran’s diverging interests regarding 
the US limits the extent of their opposition towards Washington. Unlike Tehran who is 
almost entirely cut off from the US’s economy and has to deal with numerous American-led 
international sanctions, Beijing depends greatly on Washington for its economic growth and 
the protection of its oil shipments along East Asian sea routes. Thus, China’s desire to 
counter America’s dominance in the Middle East is limited by its dependence on favourable 
trade and investment relations with Washington.250 
In sum, in spite of the imposition of international sanctions against Iran, Sino-Iranian 
relations have grown considerably. This is particularly demonstrated by the increase in trade 
between the two countries, as well as their shared interest in expanding relations to 
encompass non-energy related cooperation and investment. Nevertheless, energy (particularly 
the export of large amounts of oil to China) remains the cornerstone of this relationship – it is 
a significant factor that rationalises Beijing’s maintenance of ties with the internationally 
condemned Tehran. However, as a result of a risky Iranian business climate, Chinese NECs 
have been stalling the implementation of energy agreements with Iranian suppliers. This has 
led to increased doubts over China’s commitment to Iran in the face of Western calls for 
Beijing to distance itself from a nuclear-aspirant Tehran. Aside from Iran’s alluring 
hydrocarbon assets, the Chinese also acknowledge the significant role that Tehran can play in 
keeping a check on US influence in the Middle East. Aware of the country’s geostrategic 
position and its regional power status, Beijing has been motivated to forge sturdy ties with 
Tehran in order to counterbalance US power in the Middle East. However, unlike Iran, 
Beijing’s economic dependence on Washington limits it from significantly minimising the 
US’s dominance in the Middle East. Although Sino-Iranian relations have grown and 
strengthened over the years, diplomatic pressure placed on China to contribute to isolating 
Tehran may have influenced the Chinese to reassess their economic-energy interests in Iran. 
Nevertheless, even though the Islamic Republic is regarded as just another market and energy 
source for China, Beijing cannot be easily swayed in its decision to engage with Iran as it has 
come to play a vital role in shaping Chinese interest in the Middle East. 
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CHAPTER 4 
China’s Persian Gulf Diplomacy 
Since the Middle East, and particularly the Persian Gulf, assumes a vital position in Beijing’s 
energy security, this thesis would not be complete without an analysis of China’s Persian 
Gulf diplomacy. This chapter, firstly, demonstrates why the Gulf is important to Beijing’s 
energy accumulation drive and how the PRC, by fostering economic interdependence 
between China and Gulf countries, hopes to lock into the area’s energy resources. Secondly, 
by analysing Beijing’s US-Iran balancing act and its response to international sanctions 
against Tehran, this chapter illustrates that China has carefully calculated its actions in this 
region so as to avoid straining its relationship with Washington. 
Although Gulf countries do not border the PRC, the region has become, “a natural and certain 
extension of China’s neighbouring areas.”251 The Gulf is strategically related to Beijing’s 
various interests because of its geopolitical location, economic opportunities, security issues 
and, most importantly, its abundant oil supplies. However, the PRC lacks the historically 
forged links and deep connections that Western powers have established with Arab states. 
Thus, the challenge for China is to strengthen its economic standing in the Middle East, 
especially with Gulf countries. Aside from being a radical and revolutionary influence during 
the Cold War, Beijing has rarely assumed a central or influential role in the region. 
This does not mean that China has been inactive in this part of the world; on the contrary, it 
has utilised numerous strategic advantages to improve its political and economic position in 
the Gulf. In doing so, China has managed to increase its energy security whilst 
simultaneously establishing foundations to enhance its political position in the Middle East. 
This could, in the face of the US’s hegemonic control of the region, embolden Beijing to 
pursue a more active role in the area. However, such an endeavour would likely interfere with 
Washington’s Middle East interests.252 Aware of China’s increasing dependence on oil 
imports, and Beijing’s willingness to interact with pariah states to extract oil and gas 
resources, the West, particularly the US, believes that Beijing will use all available means to 
satisfy its voracious oil appetite. As a result, Washington is concerned with China’s growing 
                                                          
251 Luo Yuan, “China’s Strategic Interests in the Gulf and Trilateral Relations among China, The US and Arab 
Countries,” in China’s Growing Role in the Middle East: Implications for the Region and Beyond (Washington: 
The Nixon Centre, 2010), p. 23. Accessed: 05 February 2013, URL: http://cftni.org/full-monograph-chinas-
growing-role-in-me.pdf 
252 Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther, China Oil and Global Politics, pp. 135 & 139. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
49 
 
presence in the Middle East as the Americans speculate that Beijing’s increasing involvement 
in the region could destabilise the regional order, and undermine the US’s access to oil and 
efforts to stabilise the region. However, contrary to negative accusations and predictions, Lai 
outlines that Beijing has been mindful of the US and its interests in this region, as China 
attempts to pursue its Middle-Eastern goals though a constructive and cooperative 
approach.253 Chinese and American interests regarding the Gulf diverge and have the 
potential to create serious tensions between the two states. This is clearly depicted by the 
different strategies that the US and China have taken in dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue. 
Historically, China’s ‘Persian Gulf Dilemma’ first emerged with the Iranian Revolution in 
1979 and the consequent divergent American and Chinese policy towards Iran. The Clinton 
Administration's policy of ‘dual containment’ vis-à-vis Iran and Iraq was in stark contrast to 
Beijing’s advances in establishing cooperative, multi-faceted relationships with Washington’s 
Gulf rivals.254 Given the intense focus that China places on increasing economic growth, 
Beijing has tried to avoid endangering its energy supplies and economic investments in Iran, 
whilst simultaneously steering clear of antagonising its relations with the West, particularly 
the US.255 However, with Western pressure increasing against Iran, Iranian officials are 
aware of the balancing role that China could play against the West. As such, Tehran has 
sought to use its energy assets as a political lifeline in an attempt to draw China closer.256 The 
Iranians are aware that Beijing could utilise its position as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council to provide Tehran with leverage in the international arena.257 However, 
although Beijing highly values its Sino-Iranian energy relationship and acknowledges that 
Iran’s status as the second largest oil exporter in OPEC affords China a powerful position 
within the Middle East and amongst other oil-producing states, Iranian officials may 
underestimate the importance Beijing places on its relationship with the US and, as a result, 
overestimate how far China will stretch to support Iran.258 
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4.1. China’s Energy Quest and the Persian Gulf 
With China’s rise being viewed as one of the most outstanding developments of the early 21st 
century, Beijing adopted a ‘look beyond China’ strategy to procure reliable sources of energy 
to fuel its expanding economy. This has resulted in the Asian Giant intensifying its relations 
with Persian Gulf states that are heavily endowed with energy resources. Although Beijing 
has in the past viewed events in the Middle East through a revolutionary, Maoist ideology, 
China’s policy towards the region has evolved over the last three decades from an ideological 
focus to a more rational, pragmatic approach.259 China’s growing involvement in this part of 
the globe stems from its aspirations to assume a more proactive role in maintaining a stable 
Middle East, as the PRC perceives that the Arab world provides Beijing with a platform to 
demonstrate that, as a rising power, it is a ‘responsible stakeholder’.260 China’s objectives for 
Sino-Arab relations are best expressed by former president Hu Jintao, who stresses four 
points that China and Arab states should focus on to strengthen relations. According to Hu, 
China and Arab states should strive: 
to promote political relations on the basis of mutual respect, to forge closer trade and 
economic links so as to achieve common development, to expand cultural exchanges 
through drawing upon each other's experience, and to strengthen cooperation in 
international affairs with the aim of safeguarding world peace and promoting 
common development.261 
Despite massive oil discoveries in other regions, Lee and Shalmon highlight that the Middle 
East will continue to have the largest oil reserves and lowest production costs.262 Thus, with 
an expected increase in oil import levels, Beijing is pushing to gain a larger share of Gulf oil 
markets as 51% of proven oil reserves are located in the Middle East, of which 33% is 
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situated in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.263 China is especially attracted to 
Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq as 68% of the region’s oil is located within these three states.264 
According to Budike, China’s dependency on Gulf oil is predicted to increase from an 
estimated 42% to 70% between 2015 and 2030.265 This means that, ceteris paribus, at least 
9.3 million barrels per day (mb/d) would have to be imported from this region.266 With 
energy undeniably the primary driver of Sino-Gulf relations, it is imperative that China’s 
energy security strategy recognises the importance of Gulf oil in maintaining the continued 
advancement of Beijing’s economy.267 Thus, China’s oil security in the Gulf depends on 
relentless efforts to establish economic, political and security measures to protect and ensure 
a reliable and sufficient supply of oil at convenient prices.268 
Like China, whose energy interests motivate its pursuit of Gulf countries, oil is also a driving 
factor for the Gulf’s interactions with Asia, especially the PRC. The Asian Giant is viewed by 
Gulf States as a massive market for their oil exports. In light of oil demand having 
plummeted in the wake of the global economic crisis, most GCC states are focusing on 
securing access to the Chinese domestic market which, according to Sager, is ranked as the 
fastest growing energy market in the world.269 Furthermore, Sager posits that, in light of the 
global trend amongst developed nations towards greener energy resources, Gulf oil producers 
seek new markets to lessen their dependency on traditional and established oil consuming 
nations.270 However, due to the Gulf’s comparatively steep oil prices and China’s limited 
capabilities to refine high sulphur crude oil from this region, Chinese foreign energy policy 
seeks to strengthen political relations with Gulf oil-producing states, whilst simultaneously 
courting additional suppliers whose oil can be purchased at cheaper prices.271 
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Taking into consideration US interests in the Middle East and historical ties between Western 
energy companies and Gulf oil-producing states, China, in the 1990s, adopted a foreign 
policy towards the region of, “being detached generally and involved appropriately.”272 
Essentially, this meant that with such a pragmatic orientation, the PRC had to compromise 
between its core national interests and the dominant role of the US in the Middle East. 
China’s pragmatism is essentially divided into two categories: firstly, by focusing on trade, 
economic and energy interests, Beijing downplays its ideological differences with pro-US 
Gulf States (such as Saudi Arabia).273 On the other hand, China, under the precondition of not 
challenging US interests, aims to improve relations with anti-American governments (such as 
Iran) that provide little competition for Chinese NOCs.274 However, the main evaluation of 
Beijing’s Gulf policy pertains to China’s ability to manoeuvre around pro- and anti-American 
regimes275 as there is, “something inherently instable in a Middle Eastern (sic) order that 
relies on the West for its security and on the East for its prosperity.”276 Alterman contends 
that there is little doubt that the Middle East can create contention between China and the US 
as they seek to address their differing interests in the region. 
Chinese overseas energy acquisitions in the Middle East have been considered with distrust 
as Washington fears that China’s growing presence, combined with its thirst for energy, will 
make it a destabilising force in the region.277 Yet, both countries have vested interests in the 
stability of the region for the pursuit of energy goals – the need to ensure a stable and reliable 
oil supply at a fair price. Aside from this shared concern over the Gulf’s energy security, both 
nations have an aversion towards nuclear development and the consequential possibility of an 
arms race that could severely impede Gulf oil supplies. Since energy is the common 
denominator between these two nations, cooperative, instead of competitive and conflicting, 
relations between Washington and China over the Middle East is a possibility. However, 
given their diverging interests in the region, such an assertion may be considered as too 
optimistic. Nevertheless, with common strategic, regional and energy interests shared by both 
sides, the possibility of improved bilateral Chinese-American cooperation in the Middle East 
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should not be denied, but embraced as it offers a foundation for collaboration that could not 
only improve security in the Middle East, but also enhance Sino-American relations.278 
Bajpaee cautions that, although Washington and Beijing are not engaged in explicit 
competition in the Middle East, it is not difficult to envision that the region could emerge as a 
source of contention between these two states as, in conjunction with their energy 
competition in this part of the world, China and the US present opposing models of 
international conduct.279 Whilst Washington has carried out humanitarian intervention, pre-
emptive action and regime change campaigns in the Middle East, Beijing has sought to 
refrain from such activities by adhering to its preference of non-intervention, state-
sovereignty and territorial integrity – a traditional Westphalian method of engaging in 
international affairs that has become particularly appealing to Arab states in the face of US 
attempts to spread democratic principles across the region.280 By considering the relationships 
between China, the US and the Middle East to be triangular, Alterman contends that 
interactions between any two sides can affect the other party.281 However, since a triangle 
connotes relatively equal partners where actions taken by one party can affect the other two 
sides, Yuan denies that there is a US-China-Middle E st triangle as the Americans outweigh 
the Chinese and Middle-Easterners in terms of power.282 In addition, since relations between 
the three parties have only recently emerged, all sides have to overcome numerous barriers to 
reach a stage of interconnectedness (triangle relations).283 
Although Sinologists doubt Beijing’s strategic wisdom and operational effectiveness in the 
Middle East, China believes that it can strengthen its position in the region, especially with 
Gulf States that are interested in balancing their historical overreliance on the US. 
Furthermore, given the lack of substantial improvement in the Israeli-Palestine conflict and 
the US invasion of Iraq, Gulf States have realised that China, “brings a paucity of political 
baggage to the negotiation table,” and a massive market for Middle-Eastern goods and 
services.284 Thus, China is considered to be an attractive alternative to the US. Furthermore, 
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by adhering to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, China has become more 
appealing to Middle East states as politically, unlike the US, China does not press Gulf States 
about their domestic political environments – especially the need for democracy and respect 
for human rights. Consequently, this makes dealings with China less challenging.285 
Beijing is not the only beneficiary in the Gulf-China relationship as the strengthening of ties 
with China fits well into the GCC states’ strategy to diversify their international relationships 
in an attempt to lessen their dependence on the US. China’s shift from an exporter to a 
consumer market is viewed as an opportunity for GCC countries to improve their competitive 
standing and enlarge their share in the world’s largest market.286 In this context, China’s 
open-door policy is complemented by non-politicised relationships, which have led Beijing 
and Middle-Eastern countries to make investments worth billions of dollars.287 
Although a picture of favourable circumstances for Chinese advancement in the Middle East 
has been painted, there are barriers to China’s mission of improving ties in the Persian Gulf. 
International sanctions and the US war in Iraq have hindered China from pushing its agenda 
forward in Baghdad, whilst complicated geology and a strenuous business climate have 
strained investment plans in Iran. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia, China’s largest oil exporter, is 
reluctant to privatise oil fields, although the Saudi government has offered to consider foreign 
investment in integrated domestic natural-gas projects. Chinese NOCs have not favoured this 
option as they consider it to be a costly investment which does not provide a shareholding in 
oil supplies to ship back to China.288 
Unlike the US, Japan and Europe – which have a lengthy history of importing oil from the 
Middle East, Beijing is at a disadvantage due to its late arrival in this oil rich region and 
because, in contrast to its counterparts, China is still attempting to foster secure relations with 
Middle-Eastern states that can assure the shipment of oil to the PRC.289 By deliberately 
avoiding a singular focus on oil supplies, Beijing has attempted to expand the scope of 
economic exchanges between GCC countries and itself. China’s strategy aims to build a level 
of economic interdependence between Beijing and Arab states that will result in increased 
trade (especially with regards to the purchasing of oil and gas). Through establishing 
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economic interdependence, Beijing realises that it would be difficult and economically 
straining for Gulf countries to disrupt oil supplies to China.290 Economically, China is 
pursuing a ‘two imports and one export’ strategy to advance its energy relationship with Arab 
oil-producing states.291 The ‘two imports’ refers to oil imports and the necessary capital 
needed to develop China’s oil industry, whilst the ‘one export’ refers to Beijing’s investments 
in oil exploration and development projects in the Middle East.292 
With the aim of establishing a mutually beneficial trade relationship, GCC-China trade 
increased from $12 billion in 2003 to $68 billion in 2009.293 Moreover, Beijing has allowed 
Chinese oil firms to gain a strategic foothold in the region’s energy sector by allowing NOCs 
to negotiate long-term supply contracts and production sharing arrangements directly with 
Persian Gulf governments instead of international oil firms.294 On the political front, China is 
expanding its diplomacy in the region, albeit carefully under the watchful eye of the US, as 
Beijing is aware of Washington’s potential to thwart oil supplies t  China. Although Downs 
highlights that the 1970s’ oil crisis demonstrated that bilateral relationships are, “virtually 
useless during a crisis,” the PRC seems to belay historical evidence as it persists with the 
establishment of strong bilateral ties to ensure the security of oil supply from the Gulf.295 
Several Chinese state leaders have undertaken state visits to the Middle East in an effort to 
strengthen ties in the region, especially with countries that have an aversion towards the US. 
In terms of utilising its military capabilities for its energy drive, Downs suggests that China 
could use its arms sales to develop closer ties with heavily oil endowed Middle-Eastern 
countries, as Beijing is considered to be an attractive option for states seeking ballistic-
weapons technology that the US is reluctant to provide.296 
In spite of its strategic approach towards the Gulf, China has had to rethink its strong 
dependence on Persian Gulf oil. Taking into consideration the volatility of the Middle East, 
the dominance of the US in the region, and having to ship oil through the Strait of Malacca – 
one of the most dangerous shipping lanes in the world – China has sought to aggressively 
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diversify its oil imports. In doing so, China has ventured beyond the Middle East into Africa, 
Central Asia and the Americas. However, having taken into consideration global oil 
distribution, production capacity and supply potential, many scholars such as Downs still 
emphasise that the Middle East, and especially the Persian Gulf, will continue to be 
imperative to China’s oil supply297as it is predicted that as much as 70-80 percent of China’s 
future oil imports will have to be sourced from the Middle East.298 Beijing’s three main 
NOCs have thus aggressively bid against other major oil companies in an attempt to 
monopolise the region’s vast oil reserves. This is especially evident in Iran, and specifically 
after a signed memorandum of understanding regarding bilateral energy cooperation agreed 
to the Chinese development of Iranian oil fields.299  
Moreover, China is seeking to fortify its oil security by updating its age-old refining facilities 
to process Middle-Eastern crudes, as Chinese refiners are unable to process most of the crude 
oil from the region due to the high sulphur content.300 Undertaking the construction of 
facilities that are capable of processing sour crude oil demonstrates China’s growing 
dependence on Arab oil. Furthermore, it also highlights Beijing’s view that crude imports are 
a better source of energy security as refined oil is more expensive to store and it deteriorates 
faster than crude oil.301 Yet, due to its increasing dependence on Persian Gulf oil, Beijing 
could face new strategic vulnerabilities. Although the Chinese have militarily advanced in 
giant leaps, their naval build up (however impressive) is insufficient to protect the East-Asian 
sea lanes or guarantee protected access to Persian Gulf oil.302 Thus, China acknowledges that 
it is unavoidably forced to depend on the US military to protect its access to the Gulf’s oil. As 
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a result, Beijing has to restrain its geostrategic plans for sponsoring Middle East nations that 
are hostile towards the US and its regional allies. 
Although Middle-Eastern countries may attempt to lessen their dependency on the US, states 
in the Middle East are aware of China’s reluctance to bring the hammer down on Iran – a 
potential threat to regional security. GCC members believe that, in keeping its options open, 
China is only willing to play a secondary role in the region.303 As such, Middle-Eastern states 
acknowledge that, in spite of the variety of advantages that China provides, their security 
continues to lie in NATO’s palms and therefore, by implication, in American hands.304 Arab 
states acknowledge that, unlike the US who has invested millions of dollars in attempts to 
resolve regional conflicts in the Middle East, China will maintain its secondary role in the 
region as it waits to capitalise on situations where Washington may falter. Lee and Shalmon 
assert that China accepts that it is not about to replace US dominance in the region, instead 
Beijing is focusing on shifts at the margin by proactively seeking t  enhance Sino-Arab ties. 
Since energy security is the backbone of China’s forays into the Middle East, through 
attempts to secure fuel supplies Beijing is striving to extend relationships beyond energy in 
an attempt to create an economic interdependence that can ultimately assure the shipment of 
Gulf oil to China. In seeking to improve relations with Arab nations, Lee and Shalmon posit 
that Beijing can draw on its Gulf energy dealing experiences to equip China to handle the 
diplomatic and strategic complexities of oil geo-politics in the region, especially in the 
Persian Gulf.305 However, it is essential that Beijing maintain its pragmatic stance in order to 
avoid disagreements with Gulf States and the possibility of souring its relations with its vital 
economic partner and largest export market – the US.306  
4.2. China’s Persian Gulf Dilemma: Beijing’s Balancing Act Between Iran and 
the US 
Since Beijing’s earnest engagement with Persian Gulf countries in the early 1970s, China has 
been aware of the US’s strong presence within the Gulf. This has challenged Chinese foreign 
policy to strike a fine balance between maintaining sound relations with the US against its 
interests in developing multi-faceted relationships with energy important Gulf countries. This 
                                                          
303 Sager, “GCC-China Relations: Looking Beyond Oil-Risks and Rewards,” p. 20. 
304 Magaret Karns and Karen Mingst, International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global 
Governance (Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2004), pp. 156-158. 
305 Lee and Shalmon, “Searching for Oil: China’s Oil Initiatives in the Middle East,” pp. 30-31. 
306 Bingbing, “Strategy and Politics in the Gulf as seen from China,” p. 24. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
58 
 
includes countries that are at odds with Washington’s policies. China’s ‘Persian Gulf 
Dilemma’, (often referred to as Beijing’s ‘balancing act’, tightrope walk’, and ‘dual game’) 
essentially refers to China’s efforts to balance its interests in pursuing Iran’s energy resources 
against its interests in maintaining sound relations with the US.307 This has proven to be a 
challenging task for Beijing, as Washington has repeatedly called upon China to assist US 
efforts in isolating Iran for its relentless pursuit of achieving nuclear proliferation 
capabilities.308 However, in light of China’s burgeoning energy demands, Beijing has 
developed a strategic energy relationship with Iran that is considered to be of crucial 
importance to the PRC. Aware of these two aspects of the Persian Gulf Dilemma, Chinese 
leaders have treaded carefully in this part of the world (especially with Iran) to avoid being 
perceived by Washington as a direct threat to its hegemonic position in the region. Thus, it 
has been suggested that China’s foreign policy will continue to try and balance the two 
aspects of its Persian Gulf Dilemma, as the costs of siding with either side are too great.309 
Although China will continue to avoid directly challenging the US’s hegemony in the Gulf, 
recent developments in the energy aspect of the Sino-Iranian relationship, according to 
Garver et al., highlight that Beijing has calculated that it can ‘get away with more’, in terms 
of energy investments without provoking serious US scrutiny.310 Such calculations likely 
stem from Beijing’s desire to maximise the scope of its energy investments in Iran. Having 
invested tremendously in Iran’s energy sector, Beijing is unlikely to support former Secretary 
of State, Hilary Clinton’s ambition of implementing “crippling sanctions” against Iran.311 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the Chinese perceive the US’s policy of containing 
Iran as a unilateral initiative that has been calculated by Washington to ensure its dominance 
in the region and ability to dictate to others.312 Nevertheless, aware of the importance that 
Washington places on non-proliferation, China sees very little reason to trigger American 
aggression by limiting the US’s efforts to curb the advancement of Iran’s nuclear 
capabilities.313 This became clearly evident in 1997 when American and Chinese negotiations 
over China’s nuclear cooperation with Iran resulted in Beijing suspending all nuclear, cruise 
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missile and nuclear capable ballistic missile cooperation with Tehran.314 Yet, after Russia, 
Beijing remains Iran’s second largest arms supplier. Although sensitive military technology 
to Iran has been halted, China still supplies the Islamic Republic with weapons and various 
types of military equipment. 
Even though numerous elites in decision-making ranks have voiced that China should play a 
more active role in the Middle East in order to protect its oil supply, citizens and firms in 
various Middle-Eastern countries, Beijing remains determined to keep a low profile in this 
region so as to avoid overshadowing or threatening American dominance in the area.315 This 
reflects Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy of, “observing calmly, securing our position, coping 
with affairs calmly” and, “never claiming leadership, maintaining a low profile, making some 
contributions.”316 In an attempt to stamp its neutrality between the US and Iran, Beijing 
emphasises that China seeks to, “make friends with all countries,” irrespective of a country’s 
relationship with the US.317 The Chinese insist that it is not reas nable for Washington to 
insist that China choose between the US and its rivals. It seems that Beijing is using the 
notion of, “making friends with all countries” based on China’s Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence to ‘butter its bread on both sides’. 318 Moreover, taking into consideration the rise 
in geostrategic stakes for both China and the US, Garver et al., contend that Washington is 
not buying into Beijing’s rhetoric, especially when ‘friendly cooperation’ entails Chinese ties 
with US deemed ‘pariah’ or ‘rogue’ states such as Iran.319 Ultimately, China’s relationship 
with Washington is bound to be jeopardised if Beijing does not alter the rules of its dual 
game in the Gulf as at some point the US is bound to understand Beijing’s subterfuge.320 
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Consequentially, this could lead the Americans to view the Chinese with increased 
scepticism; thus possibly leading to the demise of whatever trust and confidence Washington 
has placed in Beijing.321 Owing to Beijing’s awareness of the US’s central role in its 
economic growth, the Chinese realise that the deterioration of Sino-American relations would 
endanger China’s economic advancements and its diplomatic ‘rise’.322 As such, the PRC 
acknowledges that complete non-cooperation with Washington over Iran is not an option in 
the short term. Thus, China will continue to interact cautiously with Tehran and other Middle 
East states in an effort to avoid heightened confrontation with the US or a full partnership 
with Iran. However, Garver et al., deduce that the precise balance that Beijing strikes 
between the two parties is shifting towards a direction that focuses on China’s ability to 
garner a stronger foothold in Iran’s energy sector whilst simultaneously averting American 
suspicions. Nevertheless, Beijing’s sense of leeway does not mean that China will abandon 
caution in its dealings with Iran. 
4.2.1. China’s Stance on Sanctions against Iran 
Since the US’s first unilateral sanction against Iran in 1979, there has been an international 
campaign, mainly led by the Americans, against Tehran’s uranium enrichment project and the 
subsequent possibility of nuclear weapons’ development. Washington has expressed that 
sanctions need to be ‘crippling’, however, the US is not the only country to express 
aggressive views towards Iran.323 Similar sentiments have been voiced by other states, for 
example the former president of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, stated that sanctions need to be, 
“massive,” and according to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, actions against 
Iran have to be “biting”.324 With these views in mind, the US and its accomplices issued 
another round of sanctions against the Islamic Republic in 2010 with the aim of weakening 
the country so severely that Tehran would have no option but to halt its nuclear 
advancements. However, for sanctions to be truly effective the participation of China (Iran’s 
largest trading partner and massive oil importer) is considered to be vital. Yet, the West is 
struggling to gain Chinese support over issues that concern proliferation, sanctions, arm sales, 
trade and energy investments.325 Aware of the continued diplomatic pressure placed on China 
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to support the West’s isolation efforts, Iran seeks to project itself as a secure energy supply 
for Beijing. By doing so, Tehran aims to deepen diplomatic relations with the PRC in an 
attempt to hold on to the leverage and protection that China can offer it. This makes it 
difficult for China to side with the West as Iran is the, “only country where the risk of energy 
and foreign policy interests colliding is high”.326 
Given the extenuating circumstances, China has thus far maintained a stable relationship with 
both the US and Iran. In line with its balancing strategy, Beijing has supported sanctions 
against Iran diplomatically, and simultaneously flouted them behind closed doors to maintain 
its lucrative and strategic economic and political ties with Tehran.327 Essentially, China’s 
posture towards Iranian sanctions is best viewed as, “a microcosm of the PRC’s larger 
balancing act in pursuing economic and political leverage without upsetting Western, 
particularly American, sensitivities.”328 Thus, although China seeks to maintain its 
relationship with Iran – a strategic partner in the Middle East – it is essential for China to 
support the international campaign against the Islamic Republic in order to sustain the global 
non-proliferation regime and prevent the escalation of volatilities in this highly sensitive 
region.329 Yet, in this high stakes game of ‘geopolitical poker’ being played between the West 
and Iran over the latter’s nuclear plans, Berman believes that China has clearly placed its bet 
on Iran.330 Having assessed the possible outcomes, he states that if the Chinese are right and 
Iran does achieve nuclear capabilities it will have massive impacts on regional politics and 
global energy.331 However, if Beijing loses its wager, the Chinese economy could be severely 
affected. 
A three-pronged approach has been adopted by the international community to deal with 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions.332 The most far reaching action has been the imposition of UN 
sanctions against Iran, with the latest being Resolution 1929 which was passed in 2010. 
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Secondly, unilateral sanctions aimed at curbing international energy investment in Tehran’s 
energy sector have been issued predominantly by the US. However, in an effort to garner 
support, the US has encouraged other countries to implement nation-specific regulations or 
sanctions to assist in isolating Iran. The EU has followed suit by prohibiting EU members’ 
involvement in Iran’s energy and financial sectors.333 Furthermore, the EU’s implementation 
of an oil embargo in 2012 against Tehran has severely affected Iranian oil exports, with a 
potential loss of 20 percent in oil export sales.334 Thirdly, due to the risky and strenuous 
business climate that sanctions have created, there has been a voluntary pull out of the private 
sector from Iran. Consequently, this has severely impacted the Iranian economy.335 Since the 
international community aims to slow down Iran’s nuclear advancements and ultimately 
force the regime to abandon its nuclear aspirations, the main purpose of the three-pronged 
approach is to make it more expensive and complex for Tehran to obtain industrial equipment 
and nuclear supplies.336 Nevertheless, even though sanctions are straining the Iranian 
economy and limiting the country’s prospects for economic growth, Iran remains persistent in 
advancing its nuclear agenda.337 
Unlike Washington and its allies who have made concerted efforts to isolate Iran, the PRC is 
reluctant to join the US-led mission against Tehran. In spite of participating in UN sanctions 
against Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, China has also upheld a strong economic relationship 
with Iran that actively lessens the impact of sanctions against the Islamic Republic.338 Aware 
that China is Iran’s top trading partner and one of the largest remaining importers of Iranian 
oil, the West believes that Beijing’s participation in an oil embargo is considered to be 
imperative if the mission to impede Iran’s nuclear ambitions is to be successful. However, 
due to the PRC’s economic, energy and geostrategic interests in Iran, China is wary of 
supporting an oil embargo or meaningful sanctions against Tehran. As a result, Chinese 
policies (especially Beijing’s desire for economic growth and the emphasis that it places on 
sovereignty and non-interference), have hampered US and international efforts that aim to 
curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Noting this, Iran has, to a considerable extent, come to regard 
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China as its main diplomatic protector against external pressures.339 Nevertheless, China does 
not want to be viewed as a willing enabler that could allow Iran to become the tenth nuclear 
power in the world.340 
Essentially, China’s nuclear diplomacy towards Iran rests on three broad principles:341 (1) 
Non-intervention – avoid meddling in the domestic affairs of another country. (2) Non-
nuclear proliferation, and (3) preventing the disruption of energy supplies from the Middle 
East. Since these three points underpin China’s outlook towards Tehran, “Beijing has sought 
to balance its interests in this nuclear standoff,” by stressing both Iran’s rights and obligations 
under the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT).342 Aware of Iran’s vague nuclear plans, the 
Chinese have repeatedly voiced their disapproval towards the possibility of an Iranian nuclear 
arsenal. Furthermore, Beijing has underscored the importance for Tehran to honour its treaty 
commitments and cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 
order to address the concerns of the international community. Although Iran has repeatedly 
stated that it has no intentions of creating nuclear weaponry, Tehran has been reluctant to 
cooperate with the IAEA, making numerous states sceptical of its nuclear intentions.343 
Nevertheless, Beijing has unwaveringly maintained that diplomacy should not be written off 
as the Chinese have repeatedly emphasised that negotiations within an IAEA framework is 
still the best way to deal with Iran. Furthermore, by recognising Iran as an NPT signatory, 
Beijing has asserted that Tehran is entitled to nuclear energy and technology for civilian 
purposes.344 
However, if there was telling evidence that Tehran was on the verge of nuclear weapons 
capability, Yuan asserts that China would not hesitate to side with the international 
community to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme.345 Like the US, the PRC has a strong 
interest in preventing Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons and undermining the global 
proliferation regime. Chinese leaders are aware that a nuclear-armed Iran has the potential to 
dramatically destabilise the Middle East and trigger a nuclear arms race that could reduce 
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China’s access to critical energy supplies.346 Even though Beijing shares Middle-Eastern 
security concerns with the West, the PRC has not taken substantial measures such as the 
issuing of unilateral sanctions or the utilisation of its political leverage over Tehran to reduce 
Iran’s potential to become a nuclear country. China’s aversion towards sanctions stem from 
several considerations:347 firstly, and most importantly, Beijing places immense importance 
on the protection of its expanding energy interest in Iran. Secondly, China has an aversion 
towards ‘power politics’ – the implementation of sanctions and military force to resolve 
conflicts. Thirdly, having had sanctions directed against it in the past, Calabrese suggests 
from a constructivist point of view that Beijing sympathises with Iran. Lastly, like Russia, 
China believes that relentlessly pressurising Iran is likely to backlash, resulting in Tehran’s 
withdrawal from the NPT or unilateral military action from the US. 
Chinese leaders also perceive Washington’s endeavours to contain Iran as a unilateral 
initiative directed by American leaders to maintain the county’s dominance in the Gulf and its 
ability to impose its will on others.348 As a result, this line of thinking has not abated Chinese 
engagement with Iran. Instead, it has led some Chinese elites to believe that a nuclear-armed 
Iran could prove to be of value in keeping a check on the US and its influences in the Persian 
Gulf.349 Furthermore, Beijing is keen to demonstrate to its rivals and allies that it is loyal and 
prepared to stand by its commitments, even in the light of US pressure.350 China’s 
maintenance of relations with Iran could also be viewed as a form of retaliation against the 
US’s diplomatic and military support of Taiwan.351 Yet, from a strategic outlook, in response 
to the US’s heavy military presence in East Asia and its group of allies that encircle China, 
the Sino-Iranian relationship serves as a check against Washington. Most importantly, from a 
logical point of view, si ce Iranian oil makes up a sizeable portion of Chinese oil imports, 
China reasons that if it were to adhere to sanctions against Iran’s energy sector, the PRC 
would indirectly be sanctioning itself. 
Due to China’s reluctance to wholeheartedly support sanctions against Iran, Beijing has 
avoided participating heavily in the international sanctions regime against Tehran. Instead, in 
an attempt to avoid jeopardising its interests with both parties, China has been reserved and 
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balanced on the nuclear issue.352 Yet, China has (mostly likely due to pressure from the US) 
in line with other Security Council members, voted for sanctions against the Islamic 
Republic. However, Beijing has tactically delayed the passage of Security Council 
Resolutions and watered down sanctions to ensure the protection of its energy interests.353 
Nevertheless, with China’s stamp of approval on Resolution 1929 (the latest UN sanction 
against Iran), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad questioned Chinese and Russian motives by asking, 
“Are these countries friends and neighbours? Are they with us or looking for something 
else?”354 Having acknowledged Tehran’s scepticism of China’s motives, Chinese leaders (in 
spite of China’s hand in the implementation of Resolution 1929) re-enforced their nation’s 
political and economic commitments to Iran and emphasised interests in expanding oil and 
gas ties with Tehran. This is succinctly captured by Li Keqiang, China’s former vice premier, 
who stated that: 
China is willing to work hard with Iran, continue to push mutual political trust [sic], 
and maintain communication, dialogue and coordination on important international 
issues, to maintain regional and global peace, stability and prosperity … The key 
point is to solidly push forward existing cooperative projects, to ensure they are put 
into effect smoothly, to deepen bilateral pragmatic cooperation and promote the 
continued development of bilateral ties.355 
However, despite China’s affirmation of its commitment to Iran, the US may utilise various 
policy options and its status as China’s largest economic market to coerce Beijing to limit its 
cooperation and commitments to Iran.356 Beijing is confident though that its size and 
economic leverage over the US provides the PRC with the necessary weight to ignore calls 
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from Washington to embargo Iranian oil.357 China is willing to use Washington’s competition 
with Iran as an opportunity to grow its influence and test the boundaries of a US dominated 
international order. Tactically, China’s, “moves are calculated to reap the benefits of the US- 
Iranian conflict”.358 Due to Beijing’s international standing (a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council, a key economic partner of both Iran and the West and an important player 
in internal issues), China is positioned to collect benefits in return for its support of either 
party. For example, when Beijing cooperated with Washington to halt its nuclear cooperation 
with Iran in 1997, the US in turn committed to high profile presidential visits to China and 
the United States in 1997 and 1998.359In return for its support on limited sanctions against 
Tehran, Beijing could have possibly obtained commitments of increased oil exports from 
Iran’s neighbours, most notably Saudi Arabia.360 With the pull out of Western firms creating 
an economic gap, Chinese companies remained in Iran and leapt into the void created by 
sanctions. China’s state-owned firms were able to do so as Beijing only abides by UN 
sanctions which, unlike the US’s unilateral sanctions, contain no clear limits on energy 
investment and trade with Tehran. As a result, Chinese NOCs stepped up on investments in 
Iran by grabbing opportunities to secure gargantuan oil fields that would have, in the absence 
of sanctions, been assigned to Western companies.361 Thus, due to Beijing’s increasing 
energy activities with the Islamic Republic, China became Iran’s largest energy investor in 
2010.362 As such, Tehran has come to believe that, “sanctions are not useful nowdays (sic) 
because, we have many secondary options in markets like China.”363 Essentially, Iran has 
managed to hold its own in oil markets as its massive oil and gas reserves attract the foreign 
investment of rapidly industrialising countries such as China and India.364 However, 
sanctions against Iran prop up China’s efforts to secure discounts on Iranian crudes, as 
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Beijing utilises the fact that it is one of Iran’s largest remaining oil customers to push for 
cheaper Iranian oil prices.365 
In the face of sanctions, China has invested heavily in Iran’s energy sector, yet Beijing’s 
support of Tehran was questioned when, in light of setting a new oil imports record that 
exceeded five million b/d in April 2010, Chinese imports of Iranian crude had decreased 
whilst its other major suppliers saw an increase in their oil exports to the PRC.366 The volume 
of Iranian oil imports dropped from 354,000 b/d during the first five months of 2009 to 
193,000 b/d in the first quarter of 2010.367 Thus, in terms of China’s top oil importers Iran 
was placed at number eight in May 2010.368 The decline of Iranian oil imports in light of 
increasing imports from other sources, led oil industry analysts to ask if China lowered its 
imports from the Islamic Republic for strategic reasons possibly relating to sanctions, or if it 
was a mere pricing issue. Although concrete data is required to answer this question, it does 
not mean that speculation cannot be taken into consideration. There are suggestions that 
China is supposedly partially complying with the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA), a unilateral set of sanctions implemented by 
the US in 2010 that would most likely have sanctioned Chinese NOCs if they did not reduce 
their activities in Iran. As a result, and in an apparent deal with Washington, China’s NECs 
received instructions from Beijing to slow or halt the implementation of Iranian energy deals 
to make it easier for the Obama administration to exempt Chinese companies from 
penalties.369 Another postulation suggests that China’s Iranian oil imports declined due to the 
US urging Saudi Arabia to increase its oil exports to Beijing in an effort to decrease the 
PRC’s dependence on Iranian oil.370 Yet China’s Iranian oil imports rebounded in May 2012, 
reflecting a resolution to a commercial dispute between China United Petroleum & Chemical 
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Co. (Unipec) and National Iranian Oil Co.371 Nonetheless, despite a rebound in Iranian oil 
imports, Chinese officials have not ruled out the possibility that sanctions could still disrupt 
oil purchases from Iran. However, it seems highly unlikely that China would give up its 
Iranian oil imports and developments in Tehran’s upstream because of sanctions.372 This is 
particularly demonstrated by China’s maintenance of Iranian oil imports despite the US 
sanctioning of Zhuhai Zhenrong – a state run enterprise that is heavily involved with Iranian 
oil imports.373 Such is Chinese dedication to importing Iranian oil that, with international 
sanctions against Tehran making it difficult for China to pay Iran, Beijing has in some 
instances agreed to a barter system to trade Iranian oil for Chinese products and services. As 
a result, such agreements have assisted Tehran to bypass sanctions.374 
Overall, due to the US’s heightened concerns over Iran’s nuclear activities, the Iranian 
nuclear issue has become a prominent topic on the Sino-American diplomatic agenda. It 
seems that Beijing does not want to be cajoled into choosing sides between Iran and the 
West, as China has gone to great lengths to ensure balanced cooperation with both sides. 
Beijing has displayed that it is a willing and responsible partner in maintaining the NPT 
regime; however, by diluting sanctions, China helps Iran gain time and international space to 
push forward its nuclear agenda. As a result, the effectiveness of the US’s international 
campaign against Iran is severely hindered by China’s balancing act. Due to Beijing’s 
delicate handling of the Iranian nuclear issue, China has assumed a passive role as the PRC 
continues to press for negotiations and a peaceful resolution to the issue.375 On the energy 
front, Beijing has emphasised that it will not endorse any measures that would seriously 
jeopardise its access to Iranian hydrocarbons or Chinese NOCs pursuit of Iranian upstream 
projects. Yet, when ‘push comes to shove,’ Beijing is likely to, “agree to a relatively marginal 
expansion of existing sanctions against Iran, to keep the nuclear issue in the Security 
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Council.”376 However, due to Beijing’s vested geo-economic and strategic interests in Iran it 
can be assumed that China will not be prepared to back any measures that would be 
considered ‘crippling’. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
China’s rapid economic ascent has made the country heavily dependent on energy resources. 
Of the various fuel resources that are needed to maintain its drive for economic supremacy, 
the Chinese are particularly concerned with their oil security as their flat line oil production 
and declining reserves cannot successfully satisfy Beijing’s growing oil demand. Since the 
PRCs economic growth, social stability and national security depends – to a large extent – on 
Beijing’s ability to fulfil its increasing energy demands, the necessity of ensuring a 
continuous supply of oil has forced China to rely extensively on foreign sources to 
compensate for its limited domestic output. By drawing on various texts this thesis has sought 
to address how Beijing manages to maintain Iranian oil imports (interests) and uphold stable 
relations with Washington in the face of American-led international sanctions against Tehran. 
In doing so, this thesis set out to argue that, in light of recent sanctions against Iran, China’s 
continued economic engagement with Iran is motivated by its energy interests. Although this 
argument is substantiated on the grounds of Beijing’s reluctance to fully support international 
efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear aspirations, when one takes into consideration that Washington, 
unlike Tehran, holds a stronger influence over China’s economic development, the strength 
of the argument weakens. In attempts to remain in favour with both Iran and the US, China 
has taken a pragmatic-balanced approach towards the Iranian nuclear situation. However, 
Beijing has demonstrated that, should Tehran-Washington tensions escalate, it is willing, in 
spite of the Iranian’s alluring energy assets, to forgo its relations with Tehran in order to 
remain in comity with Washington. 
In conveying the emphasis that Beijing places on energy security, chapter two outlined that 
China has, by means of state intervention, essentially crafted a mercantilist energy strategy 
for obtaining foreign oil assets. The centrality of the state in China’s energy sector and 
foreign oil accumulation activities indicates that Beijing is pursuing fuel resources in a 
mercantilist manner. The mercantilist nature of Beijing’s ‘go-out’ strategy, as succinctly 
stated by Lieberthal and Herberg reflects the PRC’s, “sense of weakness and vulnerability 
regarding reliable and secure access to energy supplies.”377 Chinese fears of a drastic 
decrease in energy supply has rationalised China’s state intervention and support in both 
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domestic and international fuel procurement activities. Beijing’s ‘go-out’ strategy essentially 
reinforces the nexus between the Chinese government and its NOCs as the main elements of 
this plan include an active energy-oriented form of diplomacy that is extended to key fuel 
exporting regions, combined with efforts taken by China’s three major NOCs (CNPC, 
Sinopec and COOC) to garner equity deals and long-term supply contracts from a wide range 
of exporters to meet future fuel needs. 
Due to the bias of the global oil market, the PRC has deemed it necessary to assist its NOCs 
in gaining a competitive edge in the international oil scene by ‘courting’ energy rich states. 
Through the use of diplomatic, political and economic incentives China has paved the way 
for its NOCs to pursue lucrative energy investments across the globe, especially where 
Western interests are minimal. By utilising incentives that can only be dispensed by the state, 
Beijing bypasses the market in favour of gaining bilateral energy agreements that undermine 
the market’s ability to effectively determine the price and distribution of fuel supplies. 
Although this mercantilist energy strategy is condemned by the West as it contravenes global 
norms of free trade; stemming from Beijing’s scepticism of the international oil market to 
provide an uninterrupted fuel supply, the PRC favours a mercantilist approach as it allows 
China to hedge against supply disruptions and somewhat insulate itself from price hikes. 
The PRC’s accumulation of numerous equity agreements have resulted in Western nations 
becoming increasingly anxious over Beijing’s ability to ‘lock up’ oil supplies to the detriment 
of international oil markets. Such fears are aggravated by China’s willingness to engage with 
pariah states to feed to its growing energy appetite. Although Beijing’s interaction with 
pariah nations impedes its efforts to be viewed as a ‘responsible stakeholder’, seeing as 
global oil markets are dominated by Western MOCs, China has extended its oil diplomacy to 
pariah states as they present Chinese NOCs with little Western competition. Thus, because of 
its vested geo-economic interests in various energy-endowed rogue states (states isolated by 
US-led Western initiatives) China has assumed a limited role in assisting the West, 
particularly the US, with isolating internationally condemned states. Though the West finds 
this frustrating due to their strained relations with such states, Western nations realise that 
Beijing’s privileged ties with pariah countries is a key ‘trump card’ that may be played by 
China to cajole US condemned nations to comply with international norms. However, if 
Beijing were to manipulate its ties with rogue states, it seems that it would be on its own 
terms (in its national interest to do so). Although China continues to maintain relations with 
US deemed pariah states, Beijing has been cautious in its dealings with such nations in order 
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to avoid undermining its vital economic interests with Washington – a key player in the 
PRC’s aspirations for unbridled economic growth. 
China’s attraction to Iran’s vast hydrocarbon reserves is the main factor that has held the 
relationship together in spite of the pressure that the West has placed on Beijing to distance 
itself from Tehran. Chapter three highlighted that, despite Iran’s long history of sanctions, 
China has continued to remain involved with the Islamic Republic on many fronts – ranging 
from their shared interests in counteracting the US’s dominance in the Middle East to 
growing bilateral trade relations. Considerations over Iran’s international pariah status is 
largely considered to be a moot point by China since it employs a mercantilist (realist) modus 
operandi, derived from its need to procure increasing amounts of fuel resources to sustain its 
mushrooming economy. 
The Sino-Iranian relationship has received a growing amount of attention as analysts attempt 
to rationalise Chinese motivations for maintaining relations with a US condemned state that 
has the potential to significantly complicate Sino-American ties. Although deep historical 
roots, shared political views and international outlooks have been outlined as important 
factors that have contributed to the endurance of Sino-Iranian relations, it is their shared 
suspicion of the US’s dominance in the Middle East and mostly China’s growing need for 
energy supplies that have significantly shaped contemporary Sino-Iranian cooperation. 
Beijing and Tehran have expressed an interest in expanding economic collaboration to 
encompass non-energy related fields; however, energy remains the cornerstone of this 
relationship. China has been quick to move into the opening that international sanctions have 
created in Iran’s energy sector, as the withdrawal of Western energy companies has provided 
Beijing with an opportunity to obtain lucrative energy deals. The PRC’s growing portfolio of 
Iranian energy investments and interests has significantly contributed to Beijing’s reluctance 
to further economic sanctions against Iran as Western nations push for more aggressive 
measures to contain Tehran’s nuclear advancements. In spite of their shared aversion towards 
US hegemony in the Middle East, China has avoided directly confronting the US over this 
energy important region as, unlike Tehran who has severed ties with Washington, the 
Chinese are aware of America’s centrality in their drive for continuous economic 
development. Nevertheless, by assisting Iran with military improvements China has sought to 
counterbalance US dominance in the Persian Gulf. Although Sino-Iranian relations have 
often been framed in terms of mutual cooperation, given Iran’s global pariah status its 
relationship with China is increasingly viewed as asymmetrical. Since sanctions against the 
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Islamic Republic have distanced the West from Iran, Tehran’s economic relationship with 
China is considered to be an existential necessity as the Iranian regime has come to view the 
PRC as a powerful ally which provides it with vital diplomatic and, most importantly, 
economic leverage to weather sanctions. 
Since Iran contains a sizable portion of Persian Gulf oil, China has vested interests in 
maintaining ties with the Islamic Republic. As pointed out in chapter two, China has 
extended its mercantilist-inspired oil diplomacy to wherever abundant energy supplies are 
available. Thus, as would be illustrated in chapter four, the Persian Gulf is a key piece in 
China’s energy puzzle and as such it is necessary to take into consideration Beijing’s energy-
driven strategy for securing Gulf fuel assets. Through efforts to secure Gulf energy resources, 
China has sought to improve relations with the region’s most prominent oil exporters, such as 
Iran. Thus, as highlighted in chapter three, China’s relationship with Iran is still relevant in 
the context of China’s growing energy needs, as well as the prevailing anti-Iranian sentiments 
from the West. However, at the same time, in navigating through a web of sanctions to 
maintain its ties with Iran, and most importantly, safeguard Chinese energy interest in the 
country, Beijing recognises that it cannot afford to provoke American ire as international 
sanctions issued against Tehran stem largely from US efforts.  
China is expected to become inextricably linked to the energy rich Persian Gulf as its oil 
consumption continues to rise. In efforts to guarantee reliable oil supplies from this part of 
the world, Beijing has sought to improve relations with Gulf States. China is progressively 
improving its standing with Arab nations as its large consumer market, demand for energy 
and avoidance of democratic lobbying provide Gulf countries with an attractive alternative to 
lessen their dependency on the US. Yet, as a result of China’s precautionary role in the region 
and its maintenance of relations with Iran – a potential threat to regional stability, GCC states 
are wary of relinquishing their dependence on the US. Nevertheless, Beijing has made 
significant advances in the Gulf, especially with regards to energy investments. By 
acknowledging that Arab states desire not to simply be viewed as mere oil banks, Beijing has 
– under the alias of improving economic cooperation – sought to secure access to the regions’ 
hydrocarbon resources, especially oil. Although China has expanded its presence in the Gulf, 
the Chinese have proceeded with caution to avoid being perceived as a threat to the 
Americans who have an expansive presence in the region. Yet, there is a growing sense that 
China is emerging as a rival of the US in the Middle East. Aware of this, some Middle-
Eastern nations have sought to encourage a Sino-American rivalry in an effort to advance 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
74 
 
their own interests. Due to the US’s suspicions of China’s increasing energy forays in the 
region, China-Gulf relations have been placed under American scrutiny. Of particular 
concern to the Americans are Sino-Iranian relations, since Beijing’s policy of engagement 
contradicts Washington’s efforts of containment.  
Although China has been repeatedly called upon to cooperate with US efforts to isolate the 
Islamic Republic, Beijing is reluctant to assume an aggressive stance against Tehran due to 
its strategic energy relationship with Iran that is reinforced by various economic agreements. 
Yet, in consolidating relations with Iran, Beijing risks causing friction with the US – a 
country that has a vital hand in ensuring China’s continued economic prosperity. Thus, the 
PRC’s ‘Persian Gulf Dilemma’ essentially pits China’s top national priorities of energy 
security and maintaining sound US relations against each other. In efforts to avoid 
jeopardising its interests with both parties the PRC has assumed a balancing approach that 
fundamentally aligns with the US in denouncing Tehran’s nuclear proliferation ambitions 
whilst simultaneously maintaining its geo-economic interests in Iran. This bifurcated 
handling of US-Iran tensions is particularly evident in China’s response to sanctions against 
Tehran. Although the PRC maintains that continued diplomacy and negotiations are a more 
effective way of dealing with Iran, Beijing has nevertheless, presumably for the sake of 
remaining in favour with Washington, had a hand in the issuing of four UN resolutions 
targeting the Islamic Republic. However, the PRC has played a significant role in delaying, 
deflecting and softening UN sanctions against Iran. Furthermore, in an attempt to avoid 
irking China, UN sanctions were craftily calibrated to avoid jeopardising Chinese Iranian 
energy interests.  
By utilising its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China, in effect, 
serves as a buffer for Iran against Western pressure. Aside from limiting the severity of UN 
sanctions, since Beijing is not obligated to adhere to unilateral measures, China’s Iranian geo-
economic investments contradict the West’s aims of debilitating Tehran’s energy sector (the 
country’s main source of revenue). Beijing’s maintenance of oil imports and expansion in 
energy investments does – to some extent – alleviate the effects of Western sanctions 
targeting Iran’s energy industry, particularly in the oil sector. Tehran has come to depend 
greatly on Beijing to replace Western investment and deflect international sanctions. 
Although China is considered to be a crutch for Iran, Beijing’s policy towards the Islamic 
Republic has repeatedly demonstrated its unwillingness to allow its relations with Iran to 
upset its ties with Washington. The PRC’s disengagement from nuclear cooperation with 
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Iran, China’s reluctance to veto the passing of UN sanctions against Tehran and the stalled 
implementation of Iranian energy agreements by Chinese NOCs have highlighted that the 
PRC is willing to adjust its cooperation with Tehran to remain in comity with Washington. 
In sum, barring the increased possibility of escalating Iran-US tensions, China’s energy 
insecurities, particularly its oil insecurity, has strongly influenced Beijing to maintain ties 
with Tehran in spite of Western efforts to press the Chinese into fully backing measures to 
curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. By continuing to maintain oil imports from the Islamic 
Republic, China has displayed that it is not willing to appease Western calls for a Chinese 
embargo on Iranian oil or support ‘crippling’ sanctions that would undoubtedly infringe on 
the PRC’s geo-economic interests in this Gulf country. However, even though Iran has 
advertised itself as a reliable energy source for the PRC, China’s fluctuating Iranian oil 
imports have increased speculations over recent years that, should the Tehran-Washington rift 
expand, it is highly likely that China would side with the US if Beijing were forced to choose 
sides over Iran’s nuclear disposition. Such a decision would inevitably affect China’s 
stronghold in Iran’s energy sector – producing serious repercussions for China’s economy, 
hence Beijing’s determination (by means of maintaining its balancing act) to forestall this 
potential scenario from occurring. 
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